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APPLICATION OF WORKMEN'S COmPENSATION LAW Or STATE Or PLACE oF CoNi nacr
TO INJURY OCCURRING OUTSIDE THE STATE
A NON-RESIDENT, alien workman was hired in California by a packing company
under a contract, executed in that state, to perform services exclusively in Alaska.
He was to be transported at the company's expense to his place of employment, to
be brought back to California at the termination of his labors, and there to be paid.
By a particular clause of the contract, the elective Alaskan compensation law was
to govern exclusively any claims arising out of the injury, and it was an express
provision of that law that it could be administered only by the designated tribunal
in whose judicial division the accident occurred.1 The workman was thereafter
injured in Alaska, but did not sue until he returned to California, evidently through
fear of losing his return passage or his pay check. The California court permitted
a recovery 2 under the California law, which was drawn expressly to cover injuries
sustained outside as well as within the state if the contract of hire was executed
in California. 3 The provision of the contract which sought to make Ataskan law
govern exclusively was held invalid as an attempt to bargain away a liability ex-
pressly imposed by the California statute.4 An appeal has been taken to the United
States Supreme Court, and probable jurisdiction noted.2
Compensation acts are said to be organically of two kinds: optionals and com-
pulsory.6 Those which are optional permit the election of some standardized form
of compensation as an alternative to a common law tort action in which the em-
ployer is shorn of effective defenses. Ordinarily the employer "freely" accepts the
compensation provisions as a condition of the contract of employment; the employee
is generally presumed to do the same unless he specifically objects in writing.
Compulsory laws offer no alternative for election, and are judicially regarded as
regulations of status,7 a species of statutory revision of tort rights and remedies.
Optional laws are considered contractual in nature, and conflicts principles applicable
to them produce these results: if a workman, hired in State A under an employment
contract executed in that state, is injured in State B in the course of either trani-
tory or permanent employment there, and if he sues in State A, he may recover
under the laws of that state,8 unless such law is either expressly limited to accidents
1. Alaska Session Laws 1929, c. 25, § 25.
2. Alaska Packers' Ass'n v. Industrial Accidents Comm., 88 Cal. Dec. 75, 34 P. (2d)
716 (1934), noted for probable jurisdiction in 55 Sup. Ct. 145 (1934).
3. CAL. GE. LAws (Deering, 1931) p. 2310, § 58. This section provided that the
act was to apply to injuries occurring to residents of California outside the state if the
contract of employment were made in California. It has been extended by judicial
construction to apply to non-residents as well. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm.,
184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), dism, sed for want of jurisdiction, 2SS U. S. 445 (1921).
4. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) p. 2296, § 27a.
5. E.g., CoNN. GE. STAT. (1930) § 5226; MAss. GEN. LAws (1932) c. 152, §§ 24, 66;
Mca. Coin,. LAws (1929) § 8410; see generally Dwan, Workmen's Compmalon ard
the Conflict of Laws (1927) 11 MwNu. L. REv. 329.
6. E.g., CAL. Gr-N. LAWS (Deering, 1931) p. 2272; N. Y. WonE. CoME. LW (1922).
7. See North AlaskU Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 3, 162 Pac. 93, 9S (1916).
8. Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co., 111 Conn. 693, 151 AUt. 182 (1930); Hagenback v.
Leppert, 66 Ind. App. 261, 117 N. E. 531 (1917); Pederzoli's Case, 269 Mlass. 50, 169
N. E. 427 (1930); Roberts v. The I. X. L. Glass Corp., 259 Mich. 644, 244 N. W. 183
(1932).
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occurring within the state or has been judicially interpreted as having been so
intended.9 If he has already received an award in State B under the laws of
that state, he may often recover again in State A, although his recovery will gen-
erally be diminished by the amount of his previous award elsewhere.10 This is
true whether or not the injured employee was a resident of State A. 1 But if
the employee, finding the law of the place of injury more favorable to him, prefers
to bring his action originally to recover under the laws of State B, the question
is presented whether the lex loci contractus necessarily governs exclusively. There
is no doubt but that the tribunal of the place of injury may recognize the law
of the place of contract, at least by refusing to apply its own law, if it should
so choose.' 2 It would seem, however, that under some conditions it must refuse
to apply its own law. In Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper13 the administratrix
of a workman, killed while engaged in transitory employment in New Hampshire,
sought to recover in that state in tort, as permitted by the law of the place of
injury, although under the law of the place of contract (Vermont), election had
been made of recovery under its optional compensation act. The Supreme Court
held that this election might be interposed as a defense to the tort action, because
9. North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93 (1916); Union
Bridge & Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm., 287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E. 609 (1919); In
re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, 102 N. E. 693 (1913); Cogliano v. Ferguson, 228 Mass. 147,
117 N. E. 45 (1917). Of the decisions cited above, all of which recognize the power of
legislators to enact a law which would have extra-territorial effect, the first two concern
compulsory, the last two, optional laws. Each of the three states subsequently amended
its law in order explicitly to give it extra-territorial effect. The Massachusetts contractual
act has been permitted this extension unquestionably (see cases in note 10, in ra). The
constitutionality of the Illinois law has been upheld in Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Induttrtal
Comm., 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930), largely on the authority of Post v. Burger
& Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916), which was narrowly limited by Cameron
v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930), at the same time at
which the Illinois court was citing it for a broader doctrine than it really held. The Post
case was also the basis for deciding the extra-territorial issue in Quong Ham Wah Co. v.
Industrial Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920), dismissed for want of jurls-
diction, 255 U. S. 445 (1921). See also RESTATEMNT, CoMzers (1934) § 398.
10. McLaughlin's Case, 274 Mass. 217, 174 N. E. 338 (1931); Migue's Case, 281 Mass,
373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933). The case of Anderson v. Jarrett-Chambers Co., 210 App.
Div. 543, 206 N. Y. Supp. 458 (3d Dep't, 1924), is noted in 10 CoPN. L. Q. 364 (1925)
as if it supported double recovery without deduction. But, although the words of the
opinion seem to support such an interpretation, they do not necessarily imply it. There
is nothing to prevent understanding an intention to allow the deduction of the New
Jersey recovery. This, indeed, was done in Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co.,
180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274 (3d Dep't, 1917), cited in the Jarrett case, The
Jarrett case was reversed on other grounds in 215 App. Div. 742, 212 N. Y. Supp. 765
(3d Dep't, 1925), and this reversal affirmed in 242 N. Y. 580, 152 N. E. 435 (1926).
See also RESTATEiMET, Cozcrs (1934) § 403.
11. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (1920),
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 255 U. S. 445 (1921); Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co.,
111 Conn. 693, 151 AtI. 182 (1930).
12. This would be the normal rule of conflicts, if recovery for the injury were purely
contractual. REsTATEMENT, CoNFLICTs (1934) § 346.
13. 286 U. S. 145 (1932), noted in (1932) 80 U. oF PA. L. REv. 1139, and (1932) 42
YALE L. J. 115.
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the elected remedy was by the law of Vermont made exclusive of other recovery.' 4
In making this decision, which effectually asserted the extra-territoriality of a
contractual compensation law, although without express reference to contractual
theory, the court added these words of limitation: "We have no occasion to con-
sider whether if the injured employee had been a resident of New Hampshire or
had been continuously employed there, or had left dependents there, recovery might
have been validly permitted under New Hampshire law."'0 The intention not to
give unduly broad doctrinal scope to this decision is further shown by a later
Supreme Court case, Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler and Tank Company,'0 in which
on slightly dissimilar facts an opposite conclusion was reached. Here the employee,
employer, and contract of hire were unmistakably connected with Tennessee in
which an optional compensation act was in force. While engaged in transitory
labor in Ohio, which had a compensation act of the compulsory type, the employee
was killed, and his widow brought suit both in Ohio and Tennessee. The Ohio
Industrial Commission made an award, and recovery of the amount paid was sought
by the state of Ohio from the Tennessee employer. The highest court of Tennesee
had in the meantime denied the widow compensation in that state on the ground
that the suit in Ohio was an abandonment of Tennessee contractual rights. The
United States Supreme Court seized on this decision to hold that since Tennessee
had construed its own law as not barring recovery under the laws of Ohio, the
Supreme Court would recognize as valid the action of the Ohio Board, and affirmed
a decree granting recovery. Where this leaves the situation is uncertain, but pre-
sumably a state may mold the extra-territorial effect of at least its contractual
compensation laws to suit its own desire.
When a workmen's compensation act is compulsory in its nature, a law said to
affect the status of employer and employee, its extra-territorial application lends
itself less readily to legal explanation. In 1916 a New York court, which desired
to extend the benefits of the New York compulsory act to an employee generally
employed in New York by a New York firm, but who happened to be injured while
in the course of transitory employment in New Jersey, attempted to reconcile the
concepts of the two types of laws.' 7 The court was hesitant to interpret a com-
pulsory regulation of the employer-employee relationship as creating in any true
sense a contractual obligation. But it developed the theory that the compulsory
law was constructively contractual, in order to explain its granting of recovery.
The practical need for a legalistic excuse of this nature was shown by the manner
in which not only later New York decisions' 8 but also those of other states used
and enlarged the doctrine, applying it to the most extreme factual situations.10 A
more recent New York decision, however, speaks slightingly of this useful logica
14. VT. PuB. LAWS (1933) § 6510.
15. Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145, 163 (1932).
16. 289 U. S. 439 (1933).
17. Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916).
18. In re J. Hospers v. J. Hungerford Smith Co., 230 N. Y. 616, 130 N. E. 916
(1921); Anderson v. Jarrett-Chambers Co., 242 N. Y. 80, 152 N. E. 435 (1926).
19. Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Comm., 184 Cal. 26, 192 Pac. 1021 (19Z0)v
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 255 U. S. 445 (1921); Beall Bros. Supply Co. v
Industrial Comm., 341 Ill. 193, 173 N. E. 64 (1930); Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co.,
169 Wis. 106, 170 N. W. 275 (1919); cf. McKesson-Fuller-Morrison Co. v. Industrial
Comm., 212 Wis. 507, 250 N. W. 396 (1933) (reaches the same results by the term
"constructive status"); Krekelburg v. M. A. Floyd Co., 166 Minn. 149, 207 N. W. 193
(1926) (same result by "localization of business within the state").
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conceit, and refuses to apply it to a particularly inapt set of circumstances. 20 While
the decision merely attacks by dictum the validity of the earlier reasoning, the
holding denies the application of it to employment at a fixed place outside the
state, leaving unimpaired the application of the doctrine to transitory work outside
the state boundaries.
2 '
Thus the extra-territorial incidence of optional and, of compulsory laws tends
to approach uniformity, as the present case indicates. Here the primary legal diffi.
culty is that the California Act is a compulsory law, and the real question at issue
is whether such an act may have the extra-territorial force which the present decision
gives it. Now if optional laws, theoretically contractual, are capable of broad
extra-territorial extension,2 2 there is little validity in denying equal extension to
compulsory laws, which meet the same economic and societal needs in much the
same way. Moreover, both types of laws are actually regulations of status, and
any attempt to attach different consequences to the application of either seems
unrealistic. This is particularly true in the instant case,' where to deny extra-
territorial effect to the compulsory California law would probably deprive the
workman of his remedy, since he could scarcely afford to go to Alaska to prosecute
his claim.
23
There is, however, an important problem remaining. If the dialectic of contract
and status law is not helpful as a real basis for deciding the incidents of extra-
territoriality, on what grounds and under what circumstances should the compen-
sation laws of one state be permitted to extend to injuries occurring outside that
state? If such an extension be granted, in what ways should it be limited so that
the employer may be protected from the risk of multiple suits, and both parties
made more certain beforehand of their rights and duties so that proper insurance
may be secured? It would seem that, if the employment beyond the state borders,
leading to the injury, were transitory and only incidental to a general employment
within the state where the contract of employment was made, there should cer-
tainly be recovery in the state of contract, since enough of the operative facts
referable to the employment have occurred there. For the protection of the em-
20. Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169 N. E. 622 (1930), noted
in (1930) 79 U. op PA. L. Rnv. 86.
21. Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 399, 169 N. E4 622, 624 (1930):
"In defining by the process of inclusion and exclusion, the scope of novel legislation,
the courts must at first be guided by abstract reasoning and anticipation of probable
consequences. Experience will at times demonstrate initial error. Then the error should
not be perpetuated by strict adherence to earlier precedents. To the extent that the
decisions in such cases as Anderson v. Jarrett-Chambers Co., supra, may on the reported
facts seem at variance with the princlple that an award may not be made for injuries
received in the course of employment at a fixed place outside the state, the cases must
be regarded as precedents of doubtful validity."
22. Falvey v. Sprague Meter Co., 111 Conn. 693, 151 Atl. 182 (1930); Hagenback
v. Leppert, 66 Ind. App. 261, 117 N. E. 531 (1917); Migue's Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183
N. E. 847 (1933); Roberts v. I. X. L. Glass Corp., 259 Mich. 644, 244 N. W. 188 (1932).
23. It is conceivable that the workman might have been able to prosecute a claim
in Alaska, although not in person, by means of an attorney and the use of depositions.
For Section 24 of the Alaska law, supra note 1, declares that compensation actions
brought in the territory shall be governed by the procedure applicable to other actions
for the recovery of money. Cases involving such procedure do not seem to have arisen,
since, for obvious reasons, a claim prosecuted in this manner would be less likely to result
favorably for the workman.
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ployer, who would normally be conducting his business and insuring with regard
to the compensation laws of that state, application of its laws should be deemed
exclusive, as indeed they were held to be in the Clapper case.13 Where the employee
is permanently employed in a state other than that wherein the contract of employ-
ment was made, it would seem proper to grant the employee recovery for any injury
under the laws of the state where he is employed, for such a fixed employment
indicates that the employer's business has to some extent been localized in that
state, and he can reasonably be expected to insure against injuries there. A further
reason for applying its law lies in the fact that the employee and his dependents
would probably have established a domicile there. At the same time it might be
just to grant the employee the alternative of seeking an award in the state of
contract, in order to provide for contingencies such as those existing in the instant
case. As a general rule, a suit in one state ought to be construed as being an
abandonment of rights in the other, in order to prevent vexing the employer with
multiple suits. Special exceptions could be made, however, to permit two suits
where this was essential to prevent injustice.2 4 There is at present no legal ground
for granting recovery under the laws of the state in which the employee merely
happens to reside, if such residence is the sole operative factor relating that state to the
accident or employment.2 5 Yet, while the state of residence would be interested
in the case because of the social obligations wrought by the injured man's dependency,
this interest would nearly always be met by the employee's recovery under the
laws of any state. And the burden placed upon the employer of seeking out the
residence of each employee and insuring himself under the provisions of the com-
pensation law of that state, in addition to those of the state of contract and state
of employment, makes the application of the law of the place of residence unwis2.
VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS AuONG STOCKHOLDERS TO CONTROL A COPORATION
PL.nqTrr, together with defendant A, purchased a small amount of stock of a cor-
poration from defendant B, the majority stockholder. A simultaneously written
contract provided that the parties would "use their best endeavors" to maintain
each other as directors and as officers. Apparently as a result of this contract, the
plaintiff held the office of treasurer of the corporation for three years, and was then
deposed when the defendants acted contrary to their agreement and failed to sup-
port him. The lower court refused to award specific performance, but upheld the
contract and granted damages for its breach. The New York Court of Appeals.
however, reversed the lower court, holding that the contract was void in its incep-
tion, on the ground that public policy opposed any attempt to hamper the freedom
of the directors to act at all times for the benefit of the corporation.' A minority
24. As for example, if the employee, acting in good faith, had been ill advi-cd to
sue in a state giving a smaller compensation award, or if the employee's survivor ued
in a state that did not grant recovery to such a survivor, although under the lavs of
the second state he might be so entitled.
25. REsTAT=rEN, Corurcrs (1934) § 400.
1. McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N. Y. 323, 189 N. E. 234 (1934). For lower court de-
cisions see 230 App. Div. 57, 242 N. Y. Supp. 543 (1st Dep't, 1930); 142 Misc. 842, 2S5
N. Y. Supp. 431 (Sup. Ct. 1932); 238 App. Div. 827, 262 N. Y. Supp. 966 (Ist DeP't,
1933).
This result was reached despite conclusive proof that the breach was due merely to the
falling out of friends, and that the plaintiff, not being guilty of any misconduct, was actu-
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of the court concurred on another ground, 2 but refused to hold the contract void
as against public policy in the absence of a showing of any intent to defraud the
other stockholders.
The judicial formulae for the restriction of corporate action were developed to
afford a means whereby the benefits of an enterprise, in which the capital of nany
individuals is amassed into a single business under the control of a comparatively
few persons, might in fact accrue equally to the owners. When the investors are
widely scattered, lack organization, and are impotent to protect their own interests,
it has been found necessary in order to protect them to impose upon the three groups
of the corporate hierarchy4 -- stockholders, directors, and officers-the duties and bur-
dens of trusteeship. Thus, not only is each group considered a separate entity which
is to act independently for the best interests of the corporation, but, moreover, a
fiduciary relationship is envisaged as existing between the groups and the individuals
thereof.5 Conceptually, a director must at all times be ready to act for the best
interests of the corporation and he may not enter into any agreement by which the
freedom of his judgment might in any way be restricted.0 Moreover, no group of
stockholders may attempt to influence a director in his decisions concerning cor-
porate affairs;7 and, accordingly, contracts to effect such a purpose are unenforce-
able.8
ally removed for protecting the corporation and the minority stockholders. The court
refused to admit that the treatment accorded the plaintiff appealed to it more strongly
than the public policy which dictates untrammeled judgment for directors of a corporation.
2. The plaintiff having been a city magistrate at the time of the making of the con-
tract, it was held unenforceable, since the regular business duties which it required of him
were held to constitute "engaging in business" within the prohibition of statute. INrRsOn
CRmqAL CouRTus AcT, N. Y. Laws 1915, c. 531, § 102, renumbered § 161 by N. Y. Laws
1933, c. 746, § 19.
3. For a vivid depiction of the state of the average stockholder in a large corporation
see Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct (1934) 47 HAav. L. REV. 1305, 1316.
4. See FLETCHER, CoRPOaRo ONS (Perm. Ed. 1931) c. 15.
5. Luthy v. Ream, 270 Ill. 170, 110 N. E. 373 (1915); Stott v. Stott, 258 Mich. 547,
242 N. W. 747 (1932); Note (1932) 18 IowA L. REv. 89.
6. "It is clear that a director has no right . . . to enter into any agreement by which
his official action would be influenced or controlled. Such an agreement would be dis-
honest and illegal; it would be an agreement to commit a breach of trust." 1 MoRAwETz,
PRIVATE COR'ORAAONS (2d ed. 1886) § 519. See also RESTATEZMNT CONTRACTS (1932)
§§ 569, 570.
7. Stockholders may, however, combine to elect certain directors, providing that It Is
not done in bad faith, or for a consideration not inuring equally to all of the stockholders.,
Faulds v. Yates, 57 Ill. 416 (1870) ("It is strange that a man cannot, for honest pur-
poses, unite with others in the protection and security of his property and rights without
liability to the charge of fraud and iniquity"); Venner v. Chicago City Rr. Co., 258 Ill.
523, 101 N. E. 949 (1913); Brightman v. Bates, 175 Mas. 105, 55 N. E. 809 (1900);
Bonta v. Gridley, 77 App. Div. 33, 78 N. Y. Supp. 961 (4th Dep't, 1902). "It is not
illegal or against public policy for two or more stockholders owning the majority of the
shares of stock to unite upon a course of corporate policy or action, or upon the officers
whom they will elect. An ordinary agreement, among a minority in number, but a ma-
jority in shares, for the purpose of obtaining control of the corporation by the election of
particular persons as directors is not illegal. . . . Agreements upon a sufficient considera-
tion between them, of such intendment and effect are valid and binding, if they do not
contravene any express charter or statutory provision or contemplate any fraud, oppres-
sion, or wrong against other stockholders, or other illegal object". Manson v. Curtis, 223
N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918).
8. West v. Camden, 135 U. S. 507 (1890); Holcomb v. Forsyth, 216 Ala. 486, 113 So.
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It is patent that such strict conventions, encompassing the exacting tests of a
fiduciary, are not in reality enforceable standards of conductY So long as directors
are dependent on the votes of stockholders for their positions, the holders of a
powerful voting bloc will continue to exercise a real influence over the actions of
directors.' 0 Nevertheless, the rule that the stockholders may not bind themselves to
influence a director to act toward a particular end has a protective value for the
minority stockholder. For example, if such a contract could be set aside only on the
ground of fraud, the only person who could attack its enforcement would be a
minority stockholder, for a contracting stockholder could not plead his own fraud as
a defense." Thus, if a contract were detrimental to the corporate interests, it could
be set aside only when it was both fraudulent, and known to the minority stockholders.
And it is the fraudulent contract that would be carefully hidden from them. The
contracting stockholders would not break the contract until the detriment to their
corporate interests exceeded the personal gain from the contract and the damages
for which they would be liable upon its breach. The rule against the validity of
these contracts, on the other hand, not only may be utilized by a minority stock-
holder who, having discovered that such a contract exists, desires to have it declared
void as detrimental to his interests,' 2 but also it will relieve a contracting stockholder
of the fear of legal liability as a result of its breach, when he has found the contract,
whether fraudulent or not, so detrimental to his interests that he regrets having
entered into it. The strict formula is, thus, important as a means of preserving the
freedom of judgment of the directors and stockholders.
Recently, however, the wisdom of utilizing the same conceptual pattern when
considering similar problems in respect to the small close corporation has been
severely criticized.13 It is said that in the comparatively minute business organiza-
516 (1927); Guernsey v. Cook, 120 Mass. 501 (1876); Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 s.
309 (1882); Harvey v. Linville Improvement Co., 118 N. C. 693, 24 S. E. 4S9 (1895);
Manson v. Curtis, 223 N. Y. 313, 119 N. E. 559 (1918); Flaherty v. Carey, 62 App. Div.
116, 70 N. Y. Supp. 951 (1st Dep't, 1901); Fabre v. O'Donohue, 185 App. Div. 779, 173
N. Y. Supp. 472 (2d Dep't, 1918); Creed v. Copps, 103 Vt. 164, 152 Atl. 369 (1930);
FnercmR, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 2104, 5719.
9. BERLE AND M -xs, TnE MODEMa CORPOaATION AND PnvATE PorEnTY (1932) 237.
10. The courts have realistically met this possibility by evolving the concept of the
"dominant stockholders", according to which a group of stockholders, who have completely
dominated the directors and managed the corporation themselves, are held to the standards
of a fiduciary for the minority. See Central Trust Co. v. Bridges, 57 Fed. 753 (C. C. A.
6th, 1893); Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Co., 64 N. J. Eq. 673, 53 At]. 342 (193);
BERLE A.=o MEA is, op. cit. supra note 9, at 233.
11. Douglas v. Standard Real Estate Loan Co., 189 Ala. 223, 66 So. 614 (1914); Noble
v. McGurk, 16 Misc. 461, 39 N. Y. Supp. 921 (Sup. Ct. 1896); Ryan v. Dox, 34 N. Y.
307 (1866); Newman v. Nellis, 97 N. Y. 285 (1834); Bonta v. Gridley, 77 App. Div. 33, 78
N. Y. Supp. 961 (4th Dep't, 1902) ("One who accepts and retains the benefit of a contract
cannot ailege, as a defense to an action upon it, that it is void as against public policy");
Hunter v. Byron, 92 Wash. 469, 159 Pac. 703 (1916).
12. "Minority stockholders . . . may sue to enjoin or redress . . . acts . . . against
public policy, which will result in a waste, misapplication, or diversion of the corporate
assets, or which may destroy the corporation or render it unable to carry out its objects,
provided the stockholder is unable to obtain relief through the corporation or its provr
officers, and providing there is no undue delay in suing, or acts constituting an estoppeV!'.
FL.Ercn a, op. cit. supra note 4, § 5823.
13. Rom cn, LAw A.m PRACICE n CoRronATE COsnMoL (1933) 215: "The time is
ripe for a sharper division of corporation law into two parts, one dealing with the large
publicly-owned corporations and the other with close corporation. This can perhaps hU
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tion of the close corporation all of the background of stockholder disorganization
and helplessness which gave rise to the concept of the fiduciary position of stock-
holders and directors is lacking, so that actually an entirely different problem is in-
volved. It is asserted that the stockholders of a small corporation have donned the
corporate veil, not as a means of securing a diversity of ownership under a concen-
tration of directive force, but merely to secure limited liability, and that conse-
quently the investor is seldom so far away from, or so ignorant of, the affairs of the
corporation that the courts must come to his protection. On the contrary, it is said,
the stockholder is probably actively and ably engaged in protecting his own interests.
Since the stockholders are either actually the directors themselves, as in the prin-
cipal case, or so control the directors as to make them mere dummies, the concept
of the board of directors as a separate entity, which is to decide independently as
to corporate affairs for the benefit of all of the reliant stockholders, is a useless fic-
tion which should be discarded. The nature of the small corporation is thus much
like that of a partnership, and the actual control of it should be recognized as belong-
ing to the stockholders, or owners, themselves, as in a partnership. Therefore, the
argument concludes, a group of stockholders of a small corporation should not be
hampered by doctrines that are intended to afford a protection which they do not
need, but they should be free to contract as they see fit, limited only by the restric-
tions that limit the powers of partners, namely that their intent shall not be in fact
fraudulent as to the other stockholders.
14
While it may be true that there are differences between the large and the small
corporation which would justify dissimilar treatment in respect to some of their
problems, 15 it is not apparent that contracts among stockholders to dominate the
directors should fall within this category. Admitting that in the close corporation
the control of the stockholders over the action of the directors is all but complete,
particularly when the stockholders are identical with the directors as in the instant
case, the strict formula would still seem to be of the same utility as in the case of
the large corporation. In the first place, it would be a difficult question of fact to
determine when a corporation was such a "close corporation" as was without the
strict rule. Moreover, it is not reasonable to suppose that the mere size of the cor-
poration or the proximity of its stockholders, in either a geographical or a business
sense, would prevent the majority group from secretly contracting to manage the
corporation. Nor would it be any less difficult for a minority stockholder of a small
corporation to discover the existence of the contract, as compared with the minor-
ity stockholder of any other corporation. The element of secrecy is as dangerous
in a small, active group as in a large, inactive group. Thus, there is here presented
the same objection that is found in the case of the large corporation. Accordingly,
the proposed liberal rule would seem to open the way for grave and irreparable in-
juries to the minority interests of even the close corporation, while a firm adherence
to the strict fiduciary concept would appear to afford them the same protection as
in the. case of the large corporation. To demonstrate that this added measure of
protection is not accorded the minority interests in a partnership is not to prove
its undesirability.
best accomplished by a statute expressly authorizing, under appropriate safeguards, the In-
corporation of limited liability companies whose management and control shall be vested
directly in the stockholders and whose internal affairs may be regulated by private con-
tract among the owners"; see also letters to the New York Law Journal, March 26, 1934,
at 1436, col. 1.
14. See the UmzmORmX PAnRxnsm Acr §§ 9, 10, 13, 14.
15. For a plea for such differentiation see Weiner, Legislative Recognition of tSe Close
Corporation (1929) 27 MIcE. L. Rav. 273.
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It is true that the rigid rule may, in some cases, work a hardship upon the in-
vestor who has bought stock from the majority holders because of a promise by
them which is subsequently found to be valueless, as in the principal case. Yet
the purchaser has at least the opportunity of discovering the legal status of such a
contract before it is made, whereas the minority investors are otherwise unprotected. 0
The rule need not decrease the flexibility of the corporate scheme of the close cor-
poration for, if such is desirable, it may be secured in several ways. The investors
may, by agreement, delimit the lengths to which each may go in making contracts
with outside parties; or a specific contract may be presented to all of the stock-
holders for their ratification when it is made. The very compactness of the group
makes it a simple matter to join all of those interested in any contract which is to
the advantage of the corporation, and such an agreement would not be subject to
attack, since no one is left out to object.17
RIGnT op NEwsPAPER TO ENJoIN BROADCAST or NEWS PUBLISHED
TE tremendous growth of radio broadcasting, fostered in its early stages by press
publicity,' is to-day regarded as a real threat to the very existence of its former
sponsor.2 Not only have newspaper advertising revenues decreased due to the large
incursions of radio into the advertising field,3 but the radio station is now also dL-
16. Moreover, it must be remembered that litigation over such a contract Will not aris
until someone suffers damage, so that only when a contract is injurious to the corporation
will its validity be tested. A situation similar to that in the principal case, in which the
majority stockholders are endeavoring to rid themselves of an oficer who is too actively
protecting the interests of the corporation, will be the exception. In such a case, juztice
might be served by allowing the minority stockholders to come into court to prote-t
against the voiding of the contract, on the ground that such a step would be directly con.
trary to the best interests of the corporation. See McQuade v. Stoneham, 262 N. Y. 323,
329, 189 N. E. 234, 236 (1934) ("The minority shareholders whose interest McQuade says
he has been punished for protecting are not, aside from himself, complaining about his diL-
charge").
17. Kantzler v. Bensinger, 214 Ill. 589, 73 N. E. 874 (1905); Lorilhard v. Clyde, S6
N. Y. 384 (1881) (a close corporation); Bonta v. Gridley, 77 App. Div. 33, 78 N. Y. Supp.
961 (4th Dep't, 1902); Drucklieb v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 211, 102 N. E. 599 (1913) (con-
tract in close corporation held binding on the parties but not on the corporation); Odell
v. Wells, 183 App. Div. 242, 171 N. Y. Supp. 345 (4th Dep't, 1918); Harris v. Magrill, 131
M1isc. 380, 226 N. Y. Supp. 621 (Sup. Ct. 1928) (a close corporation); Fells v. Katz, 256
N. Y. 67, 175 N. E. 516 (1931) (a dose corporation); FrLrcnir, op cit. sapsa note 4,
§ 2097. See also Woodruff v. Wentworth, 133 Mass. 309 (1382). The majority of the
cases cited will be seen to involve small corporations, that being the only type of corpora-
tion in which the joining of all of the stockholders is feasible.
1. Keating, Pirates of the Air (Sept. 1934) 169 H,%aR's 463.
2. Pew, Free as the Air (Jan. 1935) 3 ToAmy 8.
3. Out of an estimated national advertising budget of $510,000,000 in 1930, new--pap-rs
received $230,000,000, and radio, $27,000,000; in 1931, out of $442,500,00 0, newspaper. re-
ceived $205,000,000, and radio, $36,000,000; in 1932, out of $345,00,:00, newspapers re-
ceived $160,000,000, and radio, $39,000,000. Thus, 28% of the national advertising outlay
was diverted from the newspapers to radio in those three years. Raymond, The Coming
Fight Over News (June 1933) 161 Nzwy OuTLooK 13. In 1933, the advertising revenues of
both radio and the newspapers received a setback. In the first quarter of 1934, however,
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seminating news. Some stations either have organized their own news-gathering
agencies4 or have subscribed to established news services,5 but the expenditures of
the great majority of stations in procuring news to be broadcast is merely the cost
of the latest newspaper. 6 Those newspapers unaffiliated with radio stations have not
been slow to recognize the potential menace to their welfare and they have succeeded
in persuading at least one large news bureau to shut off the direct flow of news to
the broadcasters.7 The purchase of a newspaper by the broadcaster and the sub-
sequent broadcast of news has not effectually been barred, however. Threats to
classify radio programs as paid advertising,8 and to attack the very existence of the
radio stations9 have also proved unavailing. 10 The press, therefore, has been forced
to resort to the courts of equity.
In 1933, the Associated Press sued to enjoin radio station KSOQ from broad-
casting news "pirated" from a member newspaper in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.11
It was claimed that, despite continued protests, the defendant had continued to broad-
cast, verbatim, reports taken from the Sioux Falls daily newspaper. The defenses that
the plaintiff was not only a monopoly, but was also guilty of unfair competition were
overruled, and the District Court held that the defendant was guilty of unfair com-
petition. The news published in the plaintiff's newspaper was found to be the "prop-
erty" of the plaintiff for at least twenty-four hours after publication and the de-
fendant was enjoined from broadcasting it during that time.
radio enjoyed a 34% increase in its revenues over the same period the year before, while
newspaper revenues were increased only 21.6%. Keating, supra note 1.
4. The Transradio Press Service, but recently formed, has now opened bureaus In ten
large cities, and employs more than five hundred free-lance correspondents. Its subscriber-
ship is said to number fifty at the present time, and it is rapidly growing. See Whittemore,
Radio's Fight for News (Feb. 1935) 81 NEw REP. 354.
5. The United Press, one of the largest of the news-gathering organizations, has openly
sold its news service to such radio stations as wished to buy it. Keating, supra note 1.
6. Keating, supra note 1, at 464.
7. The Associated Press has refused to supply any radio station with news which It
has gathered. Raymond, supra note 3; N. Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1932, at 25, col. 3.
8. This has been the most effectual weapon in the hands of the press. Raymond, sutpra
note 3; Keating, supra note 1, at 465; North, Extral Extral (April 1934) 163 NEaw Our-
roox 13; (May 10, 1933) Busn-Ess WEzx 16; N. Y. Times, April 28, 1932, at 10, col. 1,
and Feb. 23, 1933, at 19, col. 7.
9. The licensing of an American broadcasting station is predicated on "public conven-
ience, interest, or necessity." ComxmucmaaoNs AcT oF 1934, 48 STAT. 1082, 47 U. S. C. A.
§ 303 (1934). The newspapers have become so desperate as to hint that the broadcasting
of "false statements and exaggerated reports" by radio stations was such a public menace
as to warrant cancellation of licenses. Report of American Newspaper Publisher's Associa-
tion, April, 1933; Raymond, supra note 3; Keating, supra note 1, at 467.
10. In December, 1933, the newspapers and principal radio systems combined In an
agreement that the four major press bureaus would collect and edit news items to be
broadcast twice daily, but not until the newspapers were on the street. (Dec. 23, 1933)
NEws WEEK 18. These bulletins, limited to thirty words and intentionally rendered color-
less, are the object of so many caustic complaints that gradually the broadcasters have
come to regret their capitulation and have abandoned the pact. It is generally said that
the agreement is a failure. (June 2, 1934) NEws WEEK 28; Whittemore, supra note 4;
Keating, supra note 1.
11. Associated Press v. Sioux Falls Broadcast Ass'n, unreported (D. S. D. March 14,
1933); see (1933) 4 Ant L. REv. 323.
But when, subsequently, the Associated Press sued to enjoin radio station KVOS,
in Bellingham, Washington, from the broadcasting of news admittedly taken from
member newspapers, after publication, the District Court refused to grant any re-
liefj 2 The plaintiff, it was held, had no "property" in the news, insofar as the
defendant was concerned, after its publication and sale. Furthermore, no competi-
tion could exist between the two, since the plaintiff sold its news and the defendant
distributed it gratuitously. And the protection of private investment must yield to
the public interest in the rapid dissemination of news. The court expressly declined
to follow the ruling in the KSO0 case.
Although Congress has definitely refused to grant the privilege of copyright to
newspapers,' 3 the Supreme Court decision in International News Senice v. Asso-
ciated Press1 4 would seem to give assurance that the "property rights" in news are
to be protected. A "quasi" property right being found in news, it was decided in
that case that, although a newspaper lost all property rights in news as against the
public after publication, this did not preclude a suit to enjoin a competitor from
reaping where it had not sown by freely republishing news from another's bulletins
and newspapers. Thus, competitors were placed under a duty so to conduct their
businesses that they would not unnecessarily or unfairly injure each other. This was,
of course, a wide extension of the protection given to business for their otherwise
unprotected "trade secrets"; for previously the doctrine of unfair competition gen-
erally had been confined to cases involving an element of outright dishonesty, such
as inducing a breach of contract or trust,1 or the "palming off" of merchandise.'
6
It was a direct departure moreover from the stand that the law recognized no
property right whatsoever in news,17 and that equity would protect the commercial
value of news only so long as it remained confidential.' 8 This decision was the basis
for the result in the KSOO case, but the court in the KVQS suit held that it was not
applicable to the litigation before it.
It would seem that the question involved in this litigation is not so simple that it
may be determined by flatly holding that the radio and the newspaper are not com-
petitors, as in the latter decision. It was there attempted to distinguish the Inter-
natioal News case 14 by demonstrating that under the facts of that case both agen-
12. Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Wash. 1934).
13. S. 1728, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. (1884), provided that any newspap'r or association
of newspapers, published in the United States, should have "the sole right to print, iz-u-,
and sell, for the term of eight hours, dating from the hour of going to press, the contents
of said . . . newspaper, or the collected news of said newspaper association." It was re-
ported that the bill should not be passed. See SEN. J., 4Sth Cong., 1st Se-_s. (1834) 543.
Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116 Fed. 126 (N. D. Ill. 190).
14. 248 U. S. 215 (1918).
15. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (1904); Hunt v.
N. Y. Cotton Exchange, 205 U. S. 322 (1905); Nat. Teleg. News Co. v. Western Union
Teleg. Co., 119 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); Board of Trade v. Tucler, 221 Fed. 305
(C. C. A. 2d, 1915); Exchange Teleg. Co. v. Gregory & Co., [1896] 1 Q. B. 147.
16. Lawrence Manufacturing Co. v. Tennessee Manufacturing Co., 138 U. S. 537 (1S90);
Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, S. & B., 198 U. S. 118 (1904); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U. S. 403 (1915); Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Bournonville, 2&0 Fed. 440 (D. N"4. J.
1914).
17. Baker v. Selden, 101 U. S. 99 (1879); Tribune Co. of Chicago v. Associated Pre-s,
116 Fed. 126 (N. D. Ill. 1900); Nat. Teleg. News Co. v. Western Union Teleg. Co, 119
Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); Davies v. Bowes, 209 Fed. 53 (S. D. N. Y. 1913).
13. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236 (1904); Tribune Co.
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cies were competitors in that both sold news, whereas in.the instant case the defen-
dant was not selling news in competition with the plaintiff but, on the contrary, was
giving it away. This distinction, however, overlooks the fact that each industry
depends upon advertising for revenue, 19 and the distribution of news and other features
by both is but a means of capturing the public interest so as to increase its value
as an advertising medium.20 This essential competition for advertising has already
been expressly recognized by other courts.21 This determined, there would seem to
be little left to decide on unfair competition; for, even granting the contention of
the broadcasters that the news bulletins flashed through the air only whet the public's
appetite for newspapers, 22 there is still little justice in compelling a business organiza-
tion to furnish a competitor with its very stock-in-trade, gathered at the cost of en-
terprise, organization, skill, labor, and money, to be used as an important means of
attracting public attention and so diverting revenues from the treasuries of the origi-
nal enterpriser.2 3 The law of unfair competition has been a gradual development
by courts of equity of the rules of the business game. If the aim of the court is to
preserve honesty and fair-dealing, application of abstruse legal doctrine must give
way to the application of the same simple standards of right and wrong that are
recognized and applied in daily life outside of the courthouse.24 To talk about "prop-
erty rights" is but to rationalize a decision that has been reached on other grounds.
Regardless of the evanescence or intangibility of news as "property," it is repugnant
to the requisites of honest commercial intercourse to appropriate to oneself with
negligible effort and cost, the fruits of another's labor, produced with considerable
effort and at great cost, and thus to create dangerous competition for the other.
2
6
It is difficult, having considered the equities, to differ from the result reached in the
KSOO case.
of Chicago v. Associated Press, 116 Fed. 126 (N. D. Ill. 1900); Nat. Teleg. News Co. v.
Western Union Teleg. Co., 119 Fed. 294 (C. C. A. 7th, 1902); F. W. Dodge Co. v. Con-
struction Information Co., 183 Mass. 62, 66 N. E. 204 (1903); Dodge Corporation v. Corn-
stock, 140 Misc. 105, 251 N. Y. Supp. 172 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
19. Obviously, since the few pennies paid for a newspaper hardly cover the expense of
the paper on which it is printed, little profit is to be gained by publishers directly through
newspaper sales. Yet, the KVOS decision ruled out the element of competition between
radio systems and the press, on the ground that a newspaper sells news, whereas the broad-
caster gives it away. It is patent, however, that the gathering and selling of news is to a
newspaper publisher but a means to an end-the gain of advertising revenue.
20. Keating, supra note 1, at 464.
21. Sorenson v. Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N. W. 82 (1932); Miles v. Louis Wasmer,
Inc., 172 Wash. 466, 20 P. (2d) 847 (1933).
22. Thomas, What's All the Shooting About? (Jan. 1935) 3 TODAY 9; (May 10, 1933)
BusINEsS WEEz 16.
23. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 (1918). Even the
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis admits the injustice of such practices, id. at 262.
See also Chamber of Commerce v. Federal Trade Comm., 13 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926).
24. Nims, UuAmn CompamoN (3d ed. 1929) c. viii.
25. This doctrine would seem to be indicated in the CommuxicAarxoNs Acr ov 1934,
48 STAT. 1103, 47 U. S. C. A. § 605 (1934), which forbids one radio station to "pirate" the
broadcasts of another, without exception: ".... no person not being authorized by the sender
shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person; and no person
not being entitled thereto shall receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign corn-
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Only clear proof of an overweening public interest in the free distribution of news
would justify any other conclusion, and that proof cannot be demonstrated. It is
true that the decision in the KSOO case would restrict the completely free activities
of radio stations, but it would not prevent them from performing the public service
of broadcasting news. The dissemination of news would not be unreasonably bur-
dened by preserving competition and making the radio stations which broadcast
news gather it themselves,4 or pay for it.5 This is already being done by some sta-
tions and, if the rights of the Associated Press and other news gathering agencies
are protected, their example will indubitably be followed by the others, for the pub-
lic desire for radio news is well recognized and must be satisfied.2  There remains
only the inevitable readjustment of the functions of radio and press in the news
field, to be worked out by the preservation of fair competition and the natural ad-
vantages and limitations of each medium. Thus, presumably, the radio would handle
the sketchy "flash" news,2 7 the newspapers, the complete records of the happenings
of the world from day to day.2 8 And, conceivably, the ultimate readjustment would
take the form of a combination of newspapers and radio stations as single news-dis-
tributing and advertising agencies3 The radio outlet would eliminate the costly
"flash extra" of the newspaper, hitherto published at a loss but in the interests of
good will,3 0 and enlarge the newspaper circulation by supplying broad subscriberships
with up-to-the-minute news bulletins to suffice until the more detailed accounts are
available in the newspaper.a1 On the side of radio, combination would be a gain
not only in eliminating the necessity for the duplication of labor in gathering its own
news, but also in ending the fear of great expense in paying for the publication of
its program schedules. Even an advertising tie-up is possible between the two, for
the practice of newspaper advertising of a radio program is becoming increasingly
munication by wire or radio and use the same or any information therein contained for his
own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto.. :' If this standard of con-
duct is to be maintained between radio stations, it is not apparent why another should
apply as between the broadcasters and the press.
26. Whittemore, supra note 4; Keating, supra note 1.
27. The advantages of radio for the "flash" bulletin are unequalled. A typical e-amp!e
of its rapidity in news broadcasting occurred on February 15, 1932, when the Columbia
Broadcasting System spread the report of the attempted assasination of President RcoZ2-
velt throughout the entire country before a single newspaper, even in Miarni, the situs of
the crime, was on the streets. Raymond, supra note 3. "Radio is beating the nev.,-pap2r
almost daily, whenever it sees an event which it deems of sufficient importance to broad-
cast." Ibid.
28. The advantages of the printed page as a permanent and complete record of world
activities are obvious. Whereas radio news is necessarily limited in time, and but a fleeting
record, the newspaper has none of these limitations. See Editorial, N. Y. Times, Dec. 4,
1932, sec. 4, at 1, col. 6.
29. This has been suggested by most commentators on the subject and seems inevitable.
Already some publishers, notably William Randolph Hearst, are buying radio stations and
broadcasting news from their own papers, thereby supplementing and advertising them.
Stockbridge, Radio and the Press (Dec. 31, 1930) OuTLoor, AND L'ZWZPEND=;T 692; Keat-
ing, supra note 1; Raymond, supra note 3.
30. Stockbridge, supra note 29.
31. It has been suggested that one of the most important of the sources of the present
conflict is the fear of the small publisher, unaffiliated with a radio station, that by the uza
of radio the more distant but better newspaper will now be enabled to attract the local
paper's subscribership. Previously, this was prevented only by the time inevitably consumed
in the transportation of papers (March 24, 1934) Busnmss Wr= 11.
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popular among radio advertisers.32 When such a readjustment, advantageous to all
concerned, is seemingly inevitable, the preservation of fair business practices which
will tend to bring it about can hardly be said to contravene the public interest.
AGENT'S CONSUMMATION or NEGOTIATIONS BEGUN BEFORE BUT CONCLUDED AFTER
TERMINATION or EMPLOYMENT
UNDER an oral contract of employment terminable at the will of either party, an
employee was engaged as a salesman for a real estate brokerage concern at the agreed
remuneration of fifty per cent of whatever commissions the principal should receive
from transactions consummated through the efforts of the employee. After working
for three years under this agreement, the employee initiated negotiations, at the behest
of his employer, for the sale of certain property whose owner had designated the
principal as its agent for the sale under a nonexclusive agency contract. One month
after a prospective purchaser had been contacted by the employee, but no deal con-
summated, the agreement of employment between the brokerage concern and its
employee was terminated unconditionally because of a dispute, unconnected with
the instant transaction. The employee left the brokerage firm, continued negotia-
tions in his own name with the prospective purchaser as agent of the owner of the
property whom he had notified, and closed the deal within a month after he bad quit
his former employment. The former employer took no further part in the nego-
tiations, but sued to have a trust imposed upon the brokerage fee received as a result
of the sale, subject to the employee's half interest in it under the terminated agree-
ment of employment. He claimed that the employee had committed a breach of the
fiduciary relationship existing between principal and agent even after termination
of the agency by concluding for his own benefit a transaction embarked upon while
the agency still was in existence. The New York Appellate Division denied the
plaintiff's claim and upheld the right of the agent to compete with his former prin-
cipal after the termination of the agency. But a dissent, based upon the contractual
relation between the parties, would have allowed the claim since, the negotiations
with the ultimate purchaser being continuous, their benefits were deemed to accrue
to the employer as soon as the contact with the purchaser was made.'
Because of the general rule of agency that an agent, be he trustee, partner, cor-
porate director, or mere servant, will not be permitted to benefit from the diversion
of the subject matter of the agency to his own use,2 there has been implicit in the
courts' analyses of situations analogous to the instant case the determination of what
rightfully belongs to the cestui, principal, corporation, or partner; for if the com-
plaint shows activities of the agent whereby he has benefited through the use of
knowledge or information not necessarily indigenous to his particular employment
but rather the possession of the general public, nothing belonging to the principal
has been wrongfully taken, and hence no remedy is available. Due to the flexible
concepts of property rights, the findings of such property of necessity have varied with
the peculiar circumstances surrounding each litigation. Thus, where the fiduciary
has diverted trade secrets of his cestui3 or has renewed in his own name a leasehold
32. Codel, Book Review (1931) 2 J. AIR L. 122.
1. Byrne & Bowman v. Barrett, 276 N. Y. Supp. 1 (1st Dep't, 1934).
2. 1 Macnrr, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1209.
3. 0. & W. Thum Co. v. Tloczynski, 114 Mich. 149, 72 N. W. 140 (1897). There Is no
adequate definition of a trade secret, but the general criterion is that it must be an idea
which has been reduced to practice although protected by neither patent nor copyright.
See Comment (1928) 42 HARV. L. REv. 254.
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of his partnership,4 corporation,5 cestui,c or principal, 7 the courts have considered
the subject matter of these diversions either as property peculiarly belonging to the
former employer, or, at least, as reasonable expectancies which the law will safeguard
from interference of this nature.8 But where the alleged secret was in reality obvious
to others besides the particular employee,9 or the expectancy so vague as to imply
more than a reasonable doubt of its achieving actuality,'0 the decisions have per-
mitted the former fiduciary to make use of its benefits after termination of the trust
relationship. The results of such determinations, where the courts have concluded
that the subject matter of the agency has been wrongfully taken, however, have
frequently been expressed in terms of bad faith, the existence of which imposes a
constructive trust on the proceeds of such illicit activity for the benefit of the
wronged cestui.l But in doing so the focus has been changed from the determina-
tion of the property interest to the ascertainment of the existence of certain inchoate
elements of bad faith. In this analysis the courts have evolved what, at best, is
a synthetic formula which makes use of the carry-all of "good conscience"'12 and
grants a remedy when there is said to exist a violation of that "punctilio of an honor
the most sensitive"'13 on the part of a trustee,0 partner,4 corporate director,5 or
4. Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123 (1874).
5. McCourt v. Singers-Bigger, 145 Fed. 103 (C. C. A. 8th, 1906); H. C. Girard Co. v.
Lamoureux, 227 Mass. 277, 116 N. E. (1917); Pikes Peek Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich.
412, 123 N. W. 19 (1909).
6. Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Repr. 223 (Ch. 1726).
7. Grumley v. Webb, 44 Mo. 444 (1869); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 123 Disc. 764, 20
N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
8. "Reasonable expectancy" is referred to most frequently when the leasehold interest
of the cestui has been secretly acquired by the fiduciary. See notes 4-7, supra.
9. Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 Atl. 753 (1922); Welch
v. Holmes, 220 Mich. 584, 190 N. W. 644 (1922); Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824,
133 N. Y. Supp. 910 (4th Dept, 1912), aff'd 210 N. Y. 529, 103 N. E. 1121 (1913); cf.
Peters Mineral Land Co. v. Hooper, 208 Ala. 324, 94 So. 605 (1922); 1 MECm!r, A==c"
§ 1211. The ordinary employment agreement implies no compact by the employee to re-
frain from soliciting the former employer's customers after termination of the agency. S.
W. Scott and Co. v. Scott, 186 App. Div. 518, 174 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Ist Dep't, 1919).
10. Moore v. Burroughs, 111 Kan. 28, 205 Pac. 1029 (1922) (agent sent to inveztigate
a specific oil field for his employer may lease an adjacent one in his own name); Stearns
v. Blevins, 262 Mass. 577, 160 N. E. 417 (1928) (one co-adventurer allowed to com-
plete the project for the employer since at the termination of the co-adventure only te
most tentative plans had been drawn up); Stemm v. Warren, 227 N. Y. 538, 125 1%. E.
811 (1920) (co-adventurer who had co-operated in drawing plans for one building was per-
mitted to undertake independently the building of an adjacent structure for the same em-
ployer who had hired the co-adventurers); d. Brady v. Powers, 112 App. Div. 845, 93
N. Y. Supp. 237 (1st Dep't, 1905).
11. Other remedies available when these elements are discovered are an accounting or
an injunction against a continuation of the wrongful appropriation. See Comment (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 782.
12. See the criterion of what constitutes violation of the fiduciary relationship as
expressed by Cardozo, J. in Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N. Y. 3S0, 383,
122 N. E. 378, 380 (1919) ("A constructive trust is the formula through which the con-
science of equity finds expression."); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 463, 164 N. E.
545, 548 (1928).
13. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 453, 460, 164 N. E. 545, 546 (1928); Comment
(1929) 42 HARv. L. Rr. 953; Comment (1929) 38 Y.L L. J. 782.
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agent7 which has resulted in the latter's acquisition of any interest which would have
benefited the cestui except for the misfeasance. But again, determination of the con-
stitution of this conduct depends upon the facts of each case. Thus activities ranging
from secretive dealings during the course of the employment, 14 to activities engaged in
after its termination have been forbidden.15 On the other hand, where the termina-
tion of the agency has resulted from the principal's lack of further interest in accom-
plishing the purpose for which the agency was established, the agent's subsequent
act in doing what the principal formerly wished to achieve has been condoned.10
But this is merely to say that where there is no subject matter to be diverted, no
breach of faith can result. And where there is no breach of faith, no constructive
trust is created. Evidently, to decide the issue in the instant case on the basis of
this doctrine would involve a rationalization based on indefinite ideology rather than
upon legal analysis; for the existence of bad faith of the employee in continuing
for his own benefit negotiations which he had inaugurated at his principal's behest,
and, perhaps, upon the latter's lead, would depend upon the alternate variables of
whether the trust relationship had been violated or whether the state of negotiations
with the prospective purchaser had reached that stage where they underwent a
subtle metamorphosis from the status of common property of all the world to a
reasonable expectancy of that particular brokerage concern, and hence the subject
matter of the agency relationship. Consequently, unless practically identical fact
situations exist as precedent in a particular jurisdiction,17 the court in approaching
each successive case of this general category, must consider the issues de novo, having
no applicable established guiding principles.
Nor would a dissection of the issues in the principal situation result in more defi-
nite standards were the analysis to proceed on a contractual basis, This approach
has figured in the analogous instances of patent infringement suits against former
employees, hired to do research work on certain devices. In these situations, since
the contract called for research activity by the employee, and since the particular
14. Proof of affirmative acts of fraud are not necessary to invoke the cestul's remedes.
Mere failure to disclose the activity is sufficient. Knapp v. Reed, 88 Neb. 754, 130 N. W.
430 (1911); Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N. Y. 123 (1874); Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458,
164 N. E. 545 (1928); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 123 Misc. 764, 206 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Sup.
Ct. 1924); Hammond Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of N. J., 259 N. Y. 312, 181 N. E.
583 (1932).
15. Trice v. Comstock, 121 Fed. 620 (C. C. A. 8th' 1903); Allen v. Adams, 16 Del.
Ch. 77, 140 AUt. 694 (1928); State ex. rel. Harris v. Gautier, 108 Fla. 390, 147 So. 240
(1933); Eoff v. Irvine, 108 Mo. 378 (1891); 1 MEcnEm, Aocv § 1239, Of course,
where the fraud is more patent, the courts more readily grant the remedy sought. Pikes
Peak Co. v. Pfuntner, 158 Mich. 412, 123 N. W. 19 (1909) (corporate director secured
renewal of corporate lease in his own name and immediately thereafter resigned his direc-
torship); Golden Cruller & Doughnut Co. v. Manasher, 95 N. J. Eq. 537, 123 AtM, 150
(1923) (agents induced employer's workers to leave their employ and aid them In a
similar enterprise they were inaugurating); Peoples' Coat, Apron & Towel Co. v. Light,
171 App. Div. 671, 157 N. Y. Supp. 15 (2d Dep't, 1916), aff'd 224 N. Y. 727, 121 N. E,
886 (1918) (after termination of employment, former employee omitted to tell the former
principal's customers of his new and independent status).
16. Harris v. Unsted, 79 Ark. 499, 96 S. W. 146 (1906);' Commercial Bank v. Weldon,
148 Cal. 601, 84 Pac. 171 (1906); Davis v. Haire, 93 Neb. 819, 142 N. W. 303 (1913);
Robichaux v. Bordages, 48 S. W. (2d) 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
17. Indeed a practically identical situation is presented in a Missouri case which
allowed recovery by the principal. Dennison & Co. v. Aldrich, 114 Mo. App. 700, 91
S. W. 1024 (1905).
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device was invented while the contract was in force, the fruits of its practical appli-
cation belong to the employer. The elements of consideration passing between the
parties are deemed to be first, the inducement of salary and, second, the opportunity
to use the equipment which emanate from the principal in exchange for the devotion
of time and energy by the agent. Whatever may be realized from the expenditure
of this time and energy during the course of the employment accrues to the employer
since he has bargained for it.'8 By the same token, in the instant case the employee
received in consideration for his promise to devote his time and energy to the ful-
fillment of his employer's aims, the promise of the employer to pay him a salary
measured by and conditioned upon the receipt of commissions by the brokerage firm,
and the advantage of using in his dealings the good will and financial reputation of
the concern. It would follow that, a valuable contact having resulted from the effort
of the employee, it immediately became the property of the employer and remained
so at the time the contract of employment was terminated, free from subsequent in-
terference by the former agent. But such a result would seem unconscionable if
projected too far into the future, so as to bar perpetually the former employee from
engaging in the transaction with the prospective purchaser even after the principal
has lost all interest in consummating the deal. Here, again, where to draw the line
must ultimately center about whether these variables of lapse of interest and length
of time after the termination of the agreement are sufficient to operate as conditions
subsequent, taking from the employer what would have been his had he pursued the
negotiations.
In effect, these elements are identical to the troublesome ingredients of "subject
matter" and "bad faith" which are the bases for the imposition of a constructive
trust.'9 Consequently, even if the supposedly more concrete contract analysis be
utilized, the decision must again depend, in the absence of an expres:s agreement of
termination, upon the facts of each litigation. On both trust and contractual ration-
alia the facts of the instant case, in disclosing that the plaintiffs, during the space of
an entire month after the defendant quit their employ, took no further action in
pursuing the negotiations with the prospective purchaser because of lack of confidence
in a successful conclusion, seem to support the determination that the breaking of
the agency agreement operated to return the parties to the status quo existing before
the contract was entered into. Therefore, it would seem that the former employee
became an independent broker in realizing the benefits of the particular contact which
had been surrendered by his erstwhile employers. The traditional objection to agree-
ments in restraint of competition would further seem to justify the decision in the
instant case in permitting the agent to consummate the deal in his own name and to
receive for himself the entire commission.
TRANSFER OF REORGANIZATION PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 77B or T=.
BANKRUPTCY ACT
SECTION 77B of the Bankruptcy Act,' which deals with corporate reorganizations,
provides that a petition to reorganize may be filed by the debtor corporation in
18. Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U. S. 52 (1924). But where the invention wvs
not in fulfillment of the purpose of the employment, the employer has no Claim to it.
Belcher v. Whittemore, 134 Mass. 330 (18I3); Detroit Testing Laboratory v. RGhtaon,
221 Mich. 442, 191 N. W. 218 (1922).
19. See supra notes 2 through 16, inclusive.
1. 43 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207 (1934), hereinafter called Section 77B.
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any district in the state in which the corporation is domiciled, or in the district
in which, during the preceding six months or the greater portion thereof, it has had
either its principal place of business or its principal assets.2 Creditors invoking
the Section3 are similarly circumscribed in their choice of a forum. 4 Although it
is probable that the debtor would enter an appearance by way of answer where
involuntary proceedings under the Section have been commenced, 5 a voluntary
petition under 77B seems to be permissible in any of the other prescribed juris-
dictions despite the pending suit.0 However, if a petition has been brought by
creditors, seeking an adjudication in bankruptcy rather than a reorganization under
77B, the debtor can obtain relief under 77B only by a petition filed in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding,7 specifically invoking that Section. The right so to answer an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy does not liberalize the venue requirements of 77',
since in an ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the choice of districts for filing is even
more restricted.8
Some doubt has arisen, however, where, under the clause providing for transfer
of the reorganization proceedings, a transfer has been sought to a jurisdiction other
than those in which, under the Section, the original petition could have been filed.
The Act, after providing for the filing of a petition in one of the three specified
districts, states: "The court shall upon petition transfer such proceedings to the
territorial jurisdiction where the interests of all the parties will be best subserved."
D
Although this clause contains the only express limitation in the Act upon the power
of the court to transfer proceedings, and although it might be construed as con-
ferring a general discretion on the court hearing the application for transfer, it
was nevertheless held in two recent decisions that no such discretion could bo
exercised by the court, and that transfer could be made only to a jurisdiction in
2. § 77B(a).
3. Ibid. Three creditors whose claims in the aggregate total $1000 over and above
any security held by them may invoke the Section.
4. Ibid. Creditors may file a petition "with the court in which such corporation might
file a petition under this section."
5. Ibid. " . . . and such corporation shall, within ten days after the service of a
copy of such petition upon it, answer such petition."
6. Cf. In re National Department Stores, Inc., 8 F. bupp. 19 (D. Del. 1934); In re
St. Louis Public Service Co., 8 F. Supp. 83 (E. D. Mo. 1934). In both of these caseq
it was held that the debtor was not deprived of the right to file a petition by reason
of the prior filing of an involuntary petition under Section 77B in the same court. It
would seem that the same reasoning would permit the debtor to seek relief in another
district. Any conflict would be resolved by transfer.
7. "Any corporation . . . may file . . . in any proceeding pending in bankruptcy
* * a petition stating the requisite jurisdictional facts under this section." Section
77B(a). This clause seems to provide the only means for avoiding a pending bankruptcy
suit under the Section. See Weiner, Corporate Reorganization: Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1934) 34 COL. L. Rzv. 1173, 1176.
8. See Section 2(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 11 (1926); id §32, 30 STAT. 554 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 55 (1926); In re American Bond
& Mortgage Co., 58 F. (2d) 379 (D. Me. 1932), aff'd in Royal Indemnity Co. v. American
Bond & Mortgage Co., 65 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933).
9. Although the wording of this clause would seem to indicate that only proceedings
initiated by the debtor could be transferred, this interpretation appears scarcely plausible.
Petition for transfer can be filed certainly by the debtor, and apparently by the requisite
number of qualified creditors who could file an original petition. See note 3, supra.
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which an original petition might have been filed. In the first case, the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware, the domicile of the debtor
corporation, refused to transfer proceedings to the Northern District of Indiana
because the debtor, in petitioning for transfer, failed to allege or prove that either
the principal place of business or the principal assets were located in Indiana.1°
The same court, in the second decision, denied a petition to transfer to the Western
District of New York, on the ground that, although the officers resided in that
district, and corporate meetings were held there, the principal place of business
and the principal assets were located in several western states where the company's
operating headquarters were situated and where its principal records were kept."
Whether considerations of convenience and expeditious procedure require an un-
limited choice of a forum seems an important inquiry. It must be remembered
that the primary purpose of 77B is not that of liquidation, but rather of reorgan-
ization,12 and for that reason bankruptcy precedents, limiting territorial jurisdiction
to the domicile and the principal place of business of the bankrupts should not
necessarily be conclusive. A more accurate analogy seems to exist in the case of
friendly receiverships, which normally aim at reorganization,23 and have been granted
in any federal district in which the corporation owned tangible assets.' 4 By a
literal interpretation of the transfer clause of 77B, similar freedom of choice could
have been obtained. It is clear, however, that Congress intended to restrict the
venue. For to limit the number of districts in which the original petition could
be filed would have been pointless if proceedings could be transferred anyw.here
at the instance of a few insistent creditors.25 The further query then arises as
to whether the statutory procedure so established is a desirable one.
10. In re Midland United Co., 8 F. Supp. 92 (D. Del. 1934).
11. In re Syndicate Oil Corp., 8 F. Supp. 213 (D. Del. 1934).
12. In the matter of Greyling Realty Corp., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1935, at 293 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935).
13. Ordinarily, to institute a so-called "friendly" receivership, a nonresident creditor files
a bill in the federal court, and the debtor joins in the prayer for a reciver. Since there
is diversity of citizenship and an apparent controversy, the federal courts seldom refuge
to take jurisdiction, especially where the corporation is a public utility and the public
interest requires its continuance. In re 'Metropolitan Ry. Receiverahip, 203 U. S. 9D (1923).
But cf. Municipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus Corp., 45 F. (2d) 902 (S. D. X. Y. 1930);
First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. 504 (1934), noted in (1934) 34 CoT.
L. Rzv. 562, to the effect that intent to reorganize is in itself not a ground for equity
jurisdiction.
14. If the suit is brought as a creditor's bill, and a receiver is requezted in aid of
judgment and execution, there is no doubt that it may be brought in any district where
there are fixed assets of the corporation. Section 55 of the Judicial Code, 36 Srxr. 1102
(1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 116 (1926). Luhrig Collieries Co. v. Interstate Coal & Doc
Co., 281 Fed. 265 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd, 287 Fed. 711 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied,
262 U. S. 751 (1923); d. Central Trust Co. v. McGeorge, 151 U. S. 129 (1894). In the
case of a stockholder's bill to conserve the assets, the objection that neither party is a
resident of the district, if a valid objection at all, Potter v. Victor Page Motors Corp.,
300 Fed. 885 (D. Conn. 1924), is one to the venue and can be waived. Burrite Coal
Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U. S. 208 (1927). But cf. Primos Chemical Co. v. Fulton
Steel Corp., 254 Fed. 454 (N. D. N. Y. 1918).
15. Opposition developed in Congress, during the consideration of the Act, to the dauz
permitting a petition to be filed in any district in the state of incorporation of the debtor
because of the fear that many reorganizations would be effected in Delawarej though
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It might be argued, in support of an unlimited choice of a forum to which pro-
ceedings under 77B could be transferred, that it would be to the greater conven-
ience of the most important class of creditors, the security holders, as well as to
the best interests of the officers of the debtor corporation, to permit a transfer of
proceedings, at least to the district where the principal security holders resided,
even though the corporation were domiciled and transacted most of its business in
another part of the country.'0 Moreover, if a transfer were permitted to any juris-
diction where, in the court's discretion, the interests of all parties would be best
served, litigation on the issue of the actual location of the "principal place of
business" would be avoided. 17 Since the Act provides that the debtor may, in
the court's discretion, be left in possession of all the assets,' 8 it could be said that
it is immaterial whether or not the greater share of the corporate business is carried
on directly under the aegis of the court effecting the reorganization. Moreover,
if supervision be found essential, under the Section a trustee or trustees may be
appointed' s and special masters deputized' o to serve anywhere in the country.
2 0
Even if an unlimited discretion as to place of transfer were granted, the require-
ment that the interests of all parties must be best subserved thereby would protect
against a transfer to a forum obviously inconvenient.
The reasons, however, for placing a construction on the transfer clause which
would limit venue under the Act, as was done in the present cases, are more per-
suasive. Such a restriction probably protects more adequately the holder of a small
claim, who is more often domiciled near the principal place of business of the
debtor and who would be greatly handicapped if forced to present his claim in a
distant court; 21 for under 77B the court taking jurisdiction may require all claims
to be litigated before it.22 The requirements of the Section are far more stringent
none of the corporate assets were located there. As a compromise, the clause was inserted
directing the court, upon petition, to transfer the proceedings. 78 Coro. RMx. 7890-7895
(1934); id. at 9897; id. at 10208. The provision permitting the federal court in the state
of domicile to take jurisdiction was retained mainly to avoid uncertainty in cases where
the location of the principal place of business is doubtful. Id. at 7892.
16. See In re Syndicate Oil Corp., 8 F. Supp. 213 (D. Del. 1934). This is a factor
which should be considered even if the possibilities for transfer were strictly limited to
one of the three original jurisdictions.
17. But if the court entertaining the original petition were uncertain about the location
of the principal place of business, it presumably would refuse to transfer the proceedings
at all, thus avoiding the danger of an appeal on this point. See note 15, supra; 78 CoNo.
fEc. 7892 (1934).
18. § 77B(c)(1).
19. § 77B(c) (11). The special masters may be referees in bankruptcy.
20. § 77B(i). See In the matter of Greyling Realty Corp., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1939,
at 293 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
21. Cf. Friendly, Some Comments on the Corporate Reorganizations Act (1934) 48
HARv. L. REv. 39, 54; 78 CoNG. Rfc. 7890 (1934).
22. The judge, "in addition to the provisions of Section 29 of this Act for the staying
of pending suits against the debtor, may enjoin or stay the commencement or continuation
of suits against the debtor until after final decree; and may, upon notice and for cause
shown, enjoin or stay the commencement or continuance of any judicial proceeding to
enforce any lien upon the estate until after final decree .. ." § 77B (c) (10) ; see Friendly,
supra note 21, at 55.
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in this respect than were the former bankruptcy 23 and equity rules. -  As for the
security holders, whether or not a limitation of venue benefits them need not be a
factor of great importance, for they normally can protect their interests more ade-
quately through committees wherever proceedings under the Section are instituted
than can the owners of heterogeneous small claims.
Another justification for limiting venue under 77B is that it would restrict the
practice, frequently characteristic of equity receiverships, of seeking a friendly court,
in which the officers of the corporation are permitted to manage its affairs and
manipulate the equities of creditors with few if any restrictions imposed.! 5 More-
over, as a result of restricting the number of districts available for transfer, the
proceedings will more frequently be brought within the jurisdiction of a court in
close proximity to the place where most of the records and books of the corporation
are kept and where its contracts are made and recorded.20  Since under 77B no
ancillary receiverships are contemplated2 7 this consideration would seem to ba more
important than hitherto. Furthermore, where proceedings under 77B, initiated in
the district of domicile, supplant federal equity receivership in a number of other
courts, the receivership court in the district of the principal place of business.
whether its jurisdiction be primary or ancillary, will presumably be best acquainted
with the affairs of the corporation; and transfer of the proceedings under 77B to
any other district would involve useless expense and delay. Moreover, if the re-
organization plan fails, and liquidation is decreed,es the iniquities of absentee super-
vision, namely, delay, expense and confusion, become even more evident. It would
seem, therefore, that limitation of the choice of districts in which proceedings under
77B can be initiated, and to which they can be transferred, is a salutory result.
EFFECT OF DISCLA=ER OF PROPERTY BY TRusn nz BANYRUPTCY on Lm:z Acqunum
WrrH Foun MONTns' PERIOD
IT is a well established doctrine that a trustee in bankruptcy may disclaim, upon
approval of the bankruptcy court, property of the bankrupt so heavily incumbered
23. The Section grants to the court exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its proprty
wherever located. § 77B(a). In addition, upon approval of the petition filed under
77B, the debtor or trustee is forthwith entitled to possession of and is vested with the title
to property being administered by a receiver appointed by any federal, state or territorial
court. § 77B(i). It also eliminates the former complicated bankruptcy procedure of
applying to a state or other federal court for authority to enjoin or stay actions against
the debtor. In re Greyling Realty Corp., N. Y. L. J., Jan. 17, 1935, at 293 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935); cf. Straton v. New, 2S3 U. S. 318 (1931); Comment (1932) 41 YAxx L. J. 445.
24. Under the former federal rule, a receiver could not sue outside his own district
except under exceptional circumstances. Booth v. Clark, 58 U. S. 322 (1354); Laughlin,
The ExtraterritoriaI Powers of Receivers (1932) 45 HAnv. L. REv. 429. Local creditors
were always protected. Ward v. Pacific lutual Life Ins. Co., 135 Cal. 235, 67 Pac. 124
(1901); see Hurd v. City of Elizabeth, 41 N. J. L. 1, 5 (1879); and the federal court
appointing the receiver could not stay personal actions against the debtor pending in state
courts. Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U. S. 218 (1929).
25. See First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U. S. S04, 517 (1934); Trieber,
The Abuses of Receiverships, 19 YAX L. J. 275 (1909); see generally LovEmrzAr, T]MS
ThvxsroR PAYS (1933), reviewed by Foster in (1933) 43 Y=xaz L. J. 352.
26. See In re Consolidated Gas Utilities Co., 8 F. Supp. 385, 387 (D. DeL 1934).
27. In the matter of Greyling Realty Corp., N. Y. L. J. Jan. 17, 1935, at 293 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935).
2S. § 77B(c)(8).
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as to be valueless to the general creditors,' thus avoiding such expenses entailed by
its administration as might be involved, for example, in foreclosure suits. No basis
for such power, however, is to be found in the express wording of the Bnkruptcy
Act, and the incidents of its exercise have received scant treatment by commentators.
Ordinarily it is simply stated, without further analysis, that title to the property on
disclaimer "reverts to or remains in" the bankrupt.2 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court was recently confronted with the problem of determining what disposition
should be made of property thus renounced by the trustee. Certain land of a debtor
had been incumbered by the execution of first and second mortgages. Thereafter
a creditor secured a judgment, which under the Pennsylvania statute became a lien
on all realty. Within four months the debtor filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy
and was subsequently adjudged a bankrupt, thus rendering the lien void under Sec-
tion 67f of the Bankruptcy Act.3 The trustee disclaimed the particular realty, under
order of the court, because the debtor's equity in it was valueless, due to the exist-
ence of the mortgages. Four years after the disclaimer, the bankrupt having been
discharged and the estate closed in the meantime, the judgment creditor instituted
proceedings to reinstate his lien. In directing that the lien be reinstated, the court
held that Section 67f was designed only for the benefit of the general creditors, and
that the bankrupt himself could not be allowed to take advantage of it by holding the
property free of the judgment lien.4
Since a disclaimer probably occurs only when the unprofitable character of the
property involved makes its inclusion in the bankrupt's estate onerous, the only sit-
uation in which issue over such a disclaimer would be raised is where there has been
a subsequent increase in the value of the property. 5 Although a valid renunciation
has apparently been regarded as irrevocable, 6 the most equitable procedure would
1. First National Bank of Jacksboro v. Lasater, 196 U. S. 115, 118 (1905) ; In re Jersey
Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905); In re Rubel, 166 Fed. 131 (E. D,
Wis. 1908), appeal dismissed, 170 Fed. 1021 (C. C. A. 7th, 1909); In re Hagin, 21 F. (2d)
434 (E. D. La. 1927); In re Menzies, 60 F. (2d) 1064 (D. Ariz. 1932); In re Kirk, 4 F.
Supp. 328 (W. D. Pa. 1933); Powers v. Johnson, 71 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934);
LovELAxD ONr BANxaupTcy (4th ed. 1912) § 375; GILBERT'S COLL=IE ON BAVnKRUmrro (3d
ed. 1934) § 1527. Apparently the approval of the court is not always deemed necesary,
but the best procedure is to apply for approval and have the application considered at a
creditors' meeting. See Grr.mRT's Corirm, supra, at § 1530.
2. LoVE.ANv, loc. cit. supra note 1. See cases cited in note 14, infra.
3. 30 STAT. 564 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107(f) (1926): ". . . . all levies, judgments,
attachments, or other liens obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is In-
solvent, at any time within four months prior to the filing of a petition in bankruptcy
against him, shall be deemed null and void in case he is adjudged a bankrupt, and the
property affected by the levy, judgment, attachment, or other lien shall be deemed wholly
discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate
of the bankrupt. .. '
4. Lawrence Savings & Trust Co. v. John B. Thorson Co., 175 Atl. 392 (Pa. 1934).
5. Creditors, of course, can guard against a mistaken or fraudulent exercise of the power.
If they believe the property is valuable, they are at liberty to apply to the court to require
the trustee to administer it as an asset. See Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1, 13 (1891);
LovErLAN, loc. cit. supra note 1; cf. In re Webb, 54 F. (2d) 1065 (C. C. A. 4th, 1932),
6. Kirstein Holding Co. v. Bangor Veritas, Inc., 131 Me. 421, 163 Atl. 655 (1933);
Irvin v. Harris, 189 N. C. 465, 127 S. E. 529 (1925); LovELANw, loe. cit. SUpra note 1;
cf. Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U. S. 1 (1891); In re Webb, 54 F. (2d) 1065 (C. C. A. 4th,
1932).
probably be to reopen the bankruptcy proceedings and to distribute the asset among
all creditors. But normally the particular equity to be distributed would be of such
slight value as to make this procedure inexpedient. A further reason for refusing to
reopen the estate would exist, as in the present case, if any protracted interval of
time had elapsed between the disclaimer and the occurrence of the accretion in ,.lue
of the equity. Moreover, the Act itself makes no specific provision for such a pro-
ceeding; Section 2(8) authorizes a reopening, it is true, but only in the event that
the estate has not been fully administered,7 and the formal renunciation of the prop-
erty would seem to constitute complete administration within the meaning of that
section.
If a reopening is not permitted, the issue becomes merely one of determining, as
between the judgment lienholder and the bankrupt, which should be allowed to retain
the equity. To recognize the claim of the bankrupt, as holding the property free of
the lien, would be, in effect, to give him a degree of protection greater than that
already afforded by the provisions in the Act relative to the discharge of parsonal
liabilitys and to the preservation of property exemptions created by state lavs
The result of such a holding would be further to immunize the debtor's property
from the claims of creditors existing at the time of the institution of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. It would seem that the Act should be regarded as expressing the maximum
protection which Congress intended the debtor to have, and that this further dis-
pensation to him, accordingly, should not be recognized.
A literal interpretation of Section 67f would lead to the conclusion that any lien
obtained through judicial proceedings within the four months' period is rendered com-
pletely void if the property is such as passes to the trustee, subject only to the trus-
tee's power to preserve the lien. If it be actually void, of course, the judgment
lenholder's claim in the instant case would be defeated. But a construction made
in the light of the function which the Section was intended to perform dictates the
contrary result, namely, that the lien is not for this purpose rendered void. The
purpose of Section 67f is to prevent preferences among creditors, and to insure a
fair distribution of the assets. The subsequent reinstatement of such a lien as here
involved cannot operate to create a preference, if the premise be granted that the
property is not available to the other creditors. The judgment lienholder will have
his claim more nearly satisfied, but not at the expense of the other creditors.
An earlier decision of the Supreme Court can be advanced as authority for a
literal interpretation of Section 67f.10 There it was held that a lien established
within the four months' period, against property exempted by state law,'1 was nulli-
fied by the adjudication of bankruptcy even though the property was not of such a
nature that title to it -would pass to the trustee. But this decision may be distin-
guished on the ground that it actually effectuates one objective of the Act in giving
the bankrupt a fresh start by allowing him to hold the exempt property free from
such a lien, whereas no such motive could exist in the present case as to property
7. 30 STAT. 545 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11(8) (1926); In re Webb, 54 F. (2d) 105S
(C. C. A. 4th, 1932); Gxrr]T's COLLuR On BArxaumvcy (3d ed. 1934) § 93.
8. §§ 14, 17, 30 STAT. 550 (1893), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 32, 35 (1926).
9. § 6, 30 STAT. 548 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 24 (1926).
10. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co. v. Hall, 229 U. S. 511 (1913). Here a creditor
had garnished in Iowa wages that were exempt under the laws of Nebraska, the debtor's
domicile. Within four months thereafter the debtor filed a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy in Nebraska and was adjudicated a bankrupt.
11. It seems that the same result would follow if the debtor waived the exemption when
the debt was created.
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merely disclaimed by the trustee. Except for a few cases which have not recognized
this distinction,12 the courts to which the problem has been presented have uniformly
reached the result of the principal case.
13
Another method of rationalizing the decision as to whether or not the lien is nulli-
fied has been to couch the result in terms of the title which passes to the bankrupt
upon disclaimer. If the bankrupt is regarded as taking the trustee's title to the prop-
erty, the lien would be ineffective as against him, since rendered void by Section 67f
against the trustee and, consequently, against those claiming under him. But if lie
takes the title which he himself had before bankruptcy, the lien would be as effective
against him as it was before the petition was filed.
14
ENFORCEMENT or BONDS EXECUTED UNDER AUTHORITY OF NATIONAL
PROHIBITION ACT
IT is well settled that where an action for the recovery of a penalty, or a proceeding
to enforce a forfeiture prescribed in a legislative act, is pending at the time of the
repeal of such act, or is instituted after the repeal, such repeal, in the absence of a
saving clause, is a bar to all further proceedings in the case except to dismiss it.1
12. People's National Bank of Independence v. Maxson, 168 Iowa 318, 329, 150 N. W.
601, 605 (1915); Duke v. Low, 135 Ore. 460, 296 Pac. 45 (1931).
13. Smith v. First National Bank of Sterling, 76 Colo. 34, 227 Pac. 826 (1924) (trustee
never appointed); Donahue v. Kohler-McLister Paint Co., 81 Colo. 244, 254 Pac. 989
(1927); Miller v. Barto, 247 Ill. 104, 93 N. E. 140 (1910); Cadwallader v. Dulac, 128 Me.
519, 149 At.'142 (1930); Frazee v. Nelson, 179 Mass. 456, 61 N. E. 40 (1901); Swaney
v. Hasara, 164 Minn. 416, 205 N. W. 274 (1925) (property never accepted); Martin v.
Green Lake State Bank, 166 Minn. 405, 208 N. W. 21 (1926) (property disclaimed); Roch-
ester Lumber Co. v. Locke, 72 N. H. 22, 54 Atl. 705 (1903) (property never accbpted);
Kobrin v. Drazin, 97 N. J. Eq. 400, 128 At. 796 (1925) (property disclaimed); McCarty
v. Light, 155 App. Div. 36, 139 N. Y. Supp. 853 (4th Dep't, 1913) (property never accepted);
Walker v. Connell, 63 N. D. 622, 249 N. W. 726 (1933), afi'd, 291 U. S. 1 (1934) (no
action by trustee) ; LoVELAD, op. cit. supra note 1, at § 438.
14. The statements in the opinions differ on this point. Sessions v. Romadka, 145 U. S.
29, 51 (1892) ("title stands as if no assignment had been made"); William G. Morrell v.
United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 379, 394 (1922); Mills Novelty Co. v. Monarch Tool & Mfg. Co.,
49 F. (2d) 28, 31 (C. C. A. 6th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 662 (1931) ("title revests in
the bankrupt"); In re Wattley, 62 F. (2d) *828, 829 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933) ("bankrupt nay
reassert whatever title he had before bankruptcy"); Cotton v. Brasher, 175 Ark. 209, 298
S. W. 1035 (1927) (title remains in bankrupt); Long v. W. P. Devereux Co., 87 Mont.
198, 286 Pac. 402 (1930); Mesiro v. Innis Speiden & Co., 88 N. J. L. 548, 97 Atl. 160 (1916);
Stephan v. Merchants' Collateral Corporation, 232 App. Div. 707, 247 N. Y. Supp, 719
(2d Dept, 1931); Metz v. Emery, 110 Kan. 405, 204 Pac. 734 (1922) (bankrupt may assert
title); Smith v. Wahl, 88 N. J. L. 623, 97 At]. 261 (1916); Melnick v. Commercial Casualty
Insurance Co. of Newark, N. J., 221 App. Div. 599, 224 N. Y. Supp. 516 (1st Dep't, 1927);
Cunningham v. Long, 188 N. C. 613, 125 S. E. 265 (1924); Abo Land Co. v. Tenorlo, 26
N. M. 258, 191 Pac. 141 (1920) (title of the trustee reverts to the bankrupt).
1. Yeaton v. United States, 5 Cranch 281 (U. S. 1809); Gulf, Colorado, & Santa Fe
Rr. Co. v. Dennis, 224 U. S. 503 (1912); United States v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 27 Fed,
Cas. No. 16296, p. 1089 (D. Wis. 1868); 1 BraiLL, CYc oPEDiA oF CaxmAL, LAW (1922) §
80; 1 WARTON, Cam nN LAW (12th ed. 1932) § 414.
The repeal of the statute is said to be an indication that the sovereign power no
longer desires the former offense to be punished or regarded as criminal 2 As a
sequel to the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the federal courts have bean
faced with a difficult problem regarding the applicability of this principle to suits on
surety bonds, executed under the authority of the National Prohibition Act, to
reclaim temporarily property seized while in illegal use. In a recent case,3 the de-
fendant's motor boat was seized by the government in July, 1930, while being used
for the illegal transportation of liquor, and held until October of the same year, at
which time it was released upon execution of a bond pursuant to the National Pro-
hibition Act.4 The Act provided that the arresting officer should take possession
of the conveyance at the time of the arrest, but that it might be returned to the
owner upon the execution by him of a surety bond, in a sum double the value of
the property, and conditioned upon the return of the seized property to the officer
on the day of the criminal trial, to abide the judgment of the court. The court,
upon the conviction of the accused, could, unless good cause to the contrary was shown
by the owner, order a sale of the seized conveyance, the receipts above the value of
preexisting liens to be deposited in the Treasury of the United States.5 The boat was
not returned when criminal proceedings were brought and the accused convicted.
In January, 1933, the government sued for judgment on the bond; the decision was
not rendered, however, until 1934, after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.
The District Court then granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint,
and the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, 7 holding that judgment should not be
given on the bond, since this would in effect be an attempt to enforce the National
Prohibition Act after it had been nullified by the passage of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.8 Although the bond could have been enforced when the vessel was not re-
turned at the date of trial, the obligation was so dependent upon the penal enforce-
ment of the National Prohibition Act that it could not now be separately enforced
as a common law obligation.
Since many bonds had been executed in conformity with the nullified Act, and
much litigation involving them is awaiting trial at the present time, the result reached
in the principal case is of great importance with regard to the future suits. In.galis-
tically, a conclusion in either direction is tenable. It is apparent that the bond
could have been enforced against both the principal and the surety if the suit upon
it had been concluded before the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, the obligation
having become due when the accused failed to return the boat at the date of the
trial. Unless the enforcement of his obligation be considered the imposition of a
criminal penalty upon him, the principal was not relieved by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment from his contractual liability on the bond. The obligation of the bond remain-
ing unpaid, the surety is, of course, liable together with the principaL But even if
2. United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934).
3. United States v. Mack, 6 F. Supp. 839 (E. D. N. Y. 1934), aif'd, 73 F. (2d) 265
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
4. 41 STAT. 305 (1919), 27 U. S. C. A. (1926).
S. 27 U. S. C. A. § 40 (1926).
6. United States v. Mlack, 6 F. Supp. 839 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).
7. United States v. Mack, 73 F. (2d) 265 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
S. United States v. Chambers, 291 U. S. 217 (1934) ; Cornerz v. United States, 69 F. (2d)
1002 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Goldberg v. United States, 69 F. (2d) 1005 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934);
United States v. Gibson, 5 F. Supp. 153 (. D. N. C. 1933).
9. This was the view taken in several decisions in litigation of an identical nature.
United States v. Biegert, 8 F. Supp. 884 (D. C. N. J. 1934); People's Saving Bank v.
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the repeal is regarded as immunizing the principal, such relief from penal liability
could be confined to him; the rationalization that the surety's contract with the
government was entirely separate and independent from the transaction between
the government and the principal may then conveniently be utilized to hold the surety
despite the principal's discharge.' 0 The surety's contractual obligations are still due
and may be now enforced by suit.
But holding the surety in such a case assumes not only that his liability is not
conditional upon that of his principal, but of necessity, also denies or minimizes
the element of the penality in the surety's obligation. Since the occasion for the
contract arose from the penal provisions of the National Prohibition Act, its obliga-
tions cannot be said to be purely contractual or purely penal; the elements of both
are undeniably present. The fact that the surety was not the wrongdoer does not
necessarily relieve its liability on the bond from penal character.11 It is apparent
that the confiscation of the boat, which the bond was intended to secure,12 was
penal.13 Then, too, even though the relief from penal liability be regarded as con-
fined to the principal and a judgment is therefore rendered against the surety, the
surety's right of recourse may force the principal ultimately to suffer the loss and
thus effect a penal enforcement against him.14 Therefore it would seem that the
enforcement of the bond against the surety may be said to be more penal than
contractual, or it may be held that the element of penality, once present, is deter-
minative.15 As soon as the granting of a judgment against the surety on the bond
is regarded as primarily the judicial enforcement of a criminal penalty, precedent
would, of course, require the discharge of the obligation.' Indeed, if the bond be
considered a mere substitute for the seized property, it is more readily apparent
United States (unreported, U. S. D. C. R. I. 1934); United States v. E. & S. Motor Trans-
portation Co., 8 F. Supp. 844 (D. C. N. Y. 1934), rev'd, 73 F. (2d) 267 (C. C. A. 2d,
1934).
10. United States v. John Barth Co., 279 U. S. 370 (1929); McCaughn v. Philadel-
phia Barge Co., 27 F. (2d) 628 (E. D. Pa. 1928) (obligations on bond and on original
liability distinguished as "primary" and "secondary"); United States v. Rennolds, 27 F.
(2d) 902 (S. D. N. Y. 1928); Gray Motor Co. v. United States, 16 F. (2d) 367 (C. C. A.
5th, 1927); cf. ApxOL, SR=snp AND GUARANTY (1927) § 22; SPENCER, SuRETysauxm
(1913) §§ 105, 106.
11. An analogous situation may be seen in the exoneration of a ball bond surety by
anything which would excuse the surrender of his principal. Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet. 329
(U. S. 1835); Kelly v. Henderson, 1 Pa. 495 (1845).
12. United States v. Randall, 58 F. (2d) 193 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); United States v.
Warnell, 67 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. Sth, 1933).
13. This may readily be inferred from the fact that such a procedure is, historically,
but a convenient derivative of the ancient doctrine of deodands. McDonald, Automobile
Forfeitures and the Eighteenth Amendment (1932) 10 TEx. L. Rav. 140.
14. Compare the similar right of a surety to reimbursement from the principal even
though the statute of limitations had barred any action against him at the time when
the surety was obliged to make payment. Leslie v. Compton, 103 Kans, 92, 172 Pac.
1015 (1918), Frew v. Scoular, 101 Neb. 131, 162 N. W. 496 (1917); Faires v. Cockerell,
88 Tex. 428, 31 S. W. 190 (1895); Norton v. Hall, 41 Vt. 471 (1868). See generally
SPENCER, op. cit. supra note 10, § 124.
15. This would seem to be the basis for the holding in the instant case, for the court
emphasized the fact that a "statutory penal feature had been added to the common-law
consensual face" of the bond. United States v. Mack, 73 F. (2d) 265, 266 (C. C. A. 2d.
1934).
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that its obligation could not now be enforced. The government would now be com-
pelled to return to its owner any conveyaqce seized in violating the National Pro-
hibition Act, but never actually confiscated. 6 Hence, the assessment against the
substitute may similarly be precluded by repeal.
The weight to be given to the factor of penality in these cases must, in the final
analysis, be determined by the practicality of the result to be attained. Despite
an inevitable reluctance to allow the sureties to be unjustly enriched by a condona-
tion of their failure to perform their obligations, and to preclude the receipt of
many thousands of dollars by an exigent national treasury, it is difficult to evade the
feeling that the bond was, in its essence, a part of the attempts to enforce the un-
popular Eighteenth Amendment A slate wiped dean of all of that effort is, app:ar-
ently, the present dictate of public policy. The manifest purge is prescribed in the
principal case.
EFFECT or BANKRUPTCY DISCHARGE PnoCUrED LESS THAN Six Y.,a.s A.Tnn
PRnvious DIscE=GE
THE Bankruptcy Act provides that when a debtor has been adjudicated bankrupt
he may apply for a cancellation of the residue of his obligations, and "the judge
shall. .. discharge the applicant, unless he has ... been granted a discharge in banh-
ruptcy within six years."1 It frequently happens, however, that the fact of a previous
discharge within the six year period is known only to the debtor who is again bank-
rupt.2 His creditors may be unaware of its existence even though it is a matter of
record, and unless the earlier release is called to the attention of the court, a second
discharge may be secured before the statutory period has elapsed. Whether, in such
an eventuality, a creditor who later discovers the fact may then enforce an obliga-
tion nominally barred by the second discharge is not clear. The exact effect of the
six-year restriction is not defined by the B'ankruptcy Act, and the consequences of
evading it are not suggested.
If the provision is regarded as a matter of defense against the extinguishment of
their claims, the creditors, not having presented the objection in the bankruptcy action,3
are precluded from raising it at any other time, since a defense which is not intro-
16. The Helen, 72 F. (2d) 772 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1934).
1. BANXRupT Y Acr § 14b(5): 44 Stat. 663 (1926), 11 U. S. C. A. § 32b(5) (Supp.
1934).
2. A debtor may be adjudicated bankrupt and have his assets distributed by a tru-ztee
notwithstanding the fact that he has been granted a discharge within the precedin. six
years. In re Little, 137 Fed. 521 (C. C. A. 7th, 1905); In re Johnson, 233 Fed. 341 (S.
D. Ala. 1916); In re Carmichael, 300 Fed. 255 (M. D. Ala. 1924); see In re Kuiler, 151
Fed. 12, 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907). Contra: In re Chase, 186 Fed. 403 (D. Blass. 1910).
see In re Vaine, 186 Fed. 535, 536 (N. D. N. Y. 1911).
3. "A creditor opposing an application for discharge . .. shall enter his appmrance in
opposition thereto on the day when the creditors are required to show case... ." General
Order XXII. "The failure to appear on the return day will ordinarily preclude a creditor
from subsequently filing specifications of objections." GnrBTr, Coru oz. B.m , u-cT7
(3d ed. 1934) 273. See also In re Chase, 186 Fed. 403 (D. MLass. 1910); In re Demp7ter,
172 Fed. 353 (C. C. A. 8th, 1909) ; cf. Bluthenthal v. Jones, 51 Fla. 396, 41 So. 533 (1935),
aff'd, 203 U. S. 64 (1908).
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duced is deemed to have been waived. 4 On the other hand, if the denial of the
debtor's right to a second discharge within six years is regarded as a limitation upon
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the same reasoning does not apply, since lack
of jurisdiction over the subject-matter cannot be waived by the parties.5 Such was
the problem presented in a recent case, where a debtor, having received a discharge
in voluntary bankruptcy proceedings, filed a second voluntary petition four years
later, listing among his debts a promissory note on which his liability as indorser
had matured. A second discharge was then obtained without opposition, but the
holder of the note later brought suit thereon in a state court, alleging that the dis-
charge in question had been granted without jurisdiction and was, consequently, void.
The state court, without clearly indicating whether it considered the restriction a
matter of defense or of jurisdiction, gave the discharge full effect and refused to
allow the creditor to recover.6
A consideration of the nature of the restriction would seem to indicate that it was
enacted as a restraint upon the conduct of debtors, rather than a protection for the
benefit of creditors to be used or waived as they choose. The fact that a debtor
has been discharged within six years is not directly detrimental to the present credi-
tors in the manner that a concealment of assets or a granting of preferences would
be. The' limitation seems more understandable when it is considered as an expression
of a public policy against too frequent discharges on the theory that debtors should
not generally be encouraged to undertake large risks, comforted by the knowledge
that the financial burden of failure can readily be discharged. Consequently, even
if the creditors were to inform the judge that they consented to the granting of a
second discharge within six years, the court probably would not feel obliged to
ignore the plain language of the statute and to sustain the application. 7 The apparent
purpose of the section can be effectuated only by regarding it as limiting the power
of the bankruptcy court. And, such a court being a creature of statute, s its juris-
4. Creditors who have been duly notified and make no opposition are regarded as con-
senting to a discharge. In re Antisdel, 1 Fed. Cas. No. 490, p. 1054 (D. Mich. 1878);
In re Clark, 5 Fed. Cas. No. 2,812, p. 855 (D. N. J. 1879); In re Thomas, 92 Fed. 912 (S.
D. Iowa, 1899). Contra: In re Sohoo, 22 Fed. Cas. No. 13,162, p. 780 (E. D. Mo. 1869);
In re Wilkinson, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17,667, p. 1253 (E. D. Mo. 1869). A default confesaes
all the material facts in the complaint and precludes any future introduction of matters of
defense. Rowe v. Table Insurance Co., 10 Cal. 441 (1858); Title Insurance Co. v. King
Land and Improvement Co., 162 Cal. 44, 120 Pac. 1066 (1912); State v. Ninth Judidal
District Court, 37 Mont. 298, 96 Pac. 337 (1908) ; Mitchell Bros. v. Southern Express Co.,
178 N. C. 235, 100 S. E. 307 (1919); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Skinner, 60 Tex,
Civ. App. 477, 128 S. W. 715 (1910).
5. Duke v. State Life Insurance Co., 4 F. Supp. 138 (W. D. Tex. 1933); see Thatcher
v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119, 125 (U. S. 1821); Willard v. Wood, 135 U. S. 309, 314 (1890);
In re Hollins, 229 Fed. 349, 351 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916).
6. Matawan Bank v. Feldman, 174 Ati. 442 (N. J. 1934).
7. Cf. In re Williams, 286 Fed. 135, 137 (W. D. S. C. 1921); Frank v. Michigan Paper
Co., 179 Fed. 776, 781 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910); In re Feinberg, 287 Fed. 254, 256 (E. D. Pa.
1923). But cf. In re Marshall Paper Co., 102 Fed. 872 (C. C. A. 1st, 1900); In re Kauf-
man, 239 Fed. 305 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
8. GInBERT's CorumR ox BAxxur'ucv (3d ed. 1934) 27; In re Hollins, 229 Fed. 349,
351 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916); In re Patterson-MacDonald Shipbuilding Co., 284 Fed. 281 (W. D.
Wash. 1922); Jones v. Kansas City Custom Garment Making Co., 1 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A.
8th, 1924).
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diction extends only as far as the strict boundaries of the powers granted it.0 Con-
sequently, since the act in clear terms forbids the granting of a discharge within six
years of a previous release, it would appear that the court has no jurisdiction to
enter such a decree,' ° and at least one federal court has recently so held."
Interpreting the limitation as a restriction on the court's jurisdiction does not, how-
ever, necessitate a conclusion contrary to that reached by the court in the instant
case. Since the defect did not appear on the record, the accepted doctrine that a
judgment regular on its face cannot be collaterally attacked by matter outside the
record12 would prevent the issue of jurisdiction from being raised in another suit.
Moreover, it would seem desirable for other reasons to hold that a discharge in bnlk-
ruptcy may not be impeached in a state court. If the plaintiff in the present action,
or any other individual creditor, were to be allowed thus to recover his claim in
full, other creditors could not do so unless the debtor is now able to pay his present
debts and all of his former debts, which is unlikely. Since there is no certain way
by which the other former creditors would learn of the fact that their supposedly
worthless claims were now collectible in law, if not in fact, the recovery of the peti-
tioning creditor may remain undiscovered until it is too late for the others to set
aside his advantage by resort to bankruptcy, and he would, in effect, receive a prefer-
ence. On the other hand, barring a recovery in the state court does not leave the
plaintiff remediless. Where a judgment has been entered without jurisdiction it may
be vacated at any time by the court which granted it.13 On such a motion in the
federal court, the adjudication of bankruptcy could be reopened.' 4 The debtor's
9. In re Armstrong, 248 Fed. 292 (S. D. Cal. 1918); In re Feinberg, 287 Fed. 254 (E.
D. Pa. 1923); In re Mc&orrow, 52 F. (2d) 643 (W. D. N. Y. 1931); In re Northridge,
53 F. (2d) 858 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); Popejoy v. Diedrich, 68 Colo. 383, 189 Pac. 841 (1920);
see In re Seeley, 21 Fed. Cas. No. 12, 628, at 1010 (E. D. Mich. 1879); In re Levenstein,
180 Fed. 957, 958 (D. Conn. 1910).
10. Analogously, violations of the preceding subsection, § 14a, have been held to deprive
the court of jurisdiction. GuamT's Coumti o. BANmuprcv (3d ed. 1934) 274; In re Fahy,
116 Fed. 239 (N. D. Iowa, 1902); see In re Emery, 6 F. Supp. 896 (E. D. Mich. 1934).
11. Denial of a discharge on the sole ground that six years had not yet paed was
held to be not a decision on the merits, but a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Philadel-
phia Loan and Finance Co. v. Robarts, 52 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). Conlra: In
re McCausland, 9 F. Supp. 129 (S. D. Cal. 1934).
12. A discharge "shall be evidence of the jurisdiction of the court, the regularity of the
proceedings, and of the fact that the order was made." Bururcr Acr § 21(f): 30
Stat. 552 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 44 (f) (1927). 1 RmmasroN, BAsurPTc (3d ed.
1923) § 35; 7 id. §§ 3189, 3463; GILBErT's Comu= o! BAm NERIPTC (3d ed. 1934) 23,
336; Lathrop v. Stuart, 14 Fed. Cas. No. 8,113, p. 1185 (C. C. Ohio, 1850); New River
Collieries Co. v. Snider, 286 Fed. 667, 670 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); Jelliffe v. Shaw, 67 F. (2d)
880 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); Joyner v. Bank of Menlo, 156 Ga. 750, 120 S. E. 4 (1923); Ross-
Lewin v. Goold, 211 Ill. 384, 71 N. E. 1028 (1904); Blair v. Hanna, 87 Ind. 293 (1S32);
Fuller v. Pease, 144 Mass. 390, 11 N. E. 694 (1887); Parker v. Atwood, 52 N. H. 181
(1872); Custard v. Wiggerson, 130 Wis. 412, 110 N. W. 263 (1907).
13. 1 BiAcr, Ju nmTrrs (1891) § 307; 2 FosrTm, Firmm Pacnce (5th ed. 1913)
§ 481; 1 FREanur, Juosxmsrrs (5th ed. 1925) § 226; United States v. Wallace, 46 Fed. 569
(D. S. C. 1891); Abraham v. Levy, 72 Fed. 124 (C. C. A. 5th, 1896); Pollitz v. Wabash
Ry. Co., 180 Fed. 950 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1910); Rehfeld v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co,
187 Fed. 810 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); McKelway v. Jones, 17 N. J. L. 345 (1839); Pantal ,.
Dickey, 123 Pa. 431, 16 Atl. 789 (1899).
14. The bankruptcy courts have the power to "set aside disclrges and rdenstate the
cases?' BA=mUPrcy Acr § 2(12): 30 Stat. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 11(12) (1927).
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funds could then be distributed among the creditors whose claims had previously
been filed, or who had become such since the discharge. Thus, not only the purpose
of the particular provision, the prevention of discharges at less than six year intervals,
but also the more general purpose of the Bankruptcy Act as a whole, an equitable pro
rata distribution of assets,'5 would be fulfilled.
TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 20 OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW
SECTION 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, in attempting to relieve from
personal liability a trustee1 who signs a negotiable instrument, provides that if the
signer adds words to his signature indicating that he signs "for or on behalf of a
principal or in a representative capacity he is not liable." 2 A review of the his-
torical legal concepts of trustee liability, however, makes it difficult to ascribe the
desired result to the language of the statute. The common law has always con-
sidered the trustee the personal owner of the trust property,3 the trust estate having
no entity. Therefore the trustee is personally liable on all contracts made by him
in the administration of the trust, just as if he held the property free of trust.
4
Thus the trustee at common law is not an agent, nor does he act for a principal.
The statute, accordingly, presents a severe logical difficulty, for the phrase "for a
principal," since it is not explained in the act, is to be taken at its common law
significance. The words "representative capacity" might have been intended to be
construed synonymously with trustee, but this would unduly limit the scope of the
Creditors whose claims arose while the discharge was in force receive a preference. BAUR-
RuPTC ACT § 64 (c): 30 Stat. 563 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 104(c) (1926); GInaT'S
COLLIER ON BANxRU TCy (3d ed. 1934) 341.
15. GILBERT'S CorLI ON BA xRuPTCY (3d ed. 1934) 3; GL.ENN, LIQUIDATION (1935)
§ 185. One of the two important features of the Bankruptcy Act is "to prevent prefer-
ences." McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 341,
358. One of the aims of the act is "to check the race of diligence among creditors." GLW,
LIQu rATION (1935) § 183. See also Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,
236 U. S. 549, 554 (1915); McDonald v. Tefft-Weller Co., 128 Fed. 381, 387 (C. C. A.
5th, 1904); Baylor v. Rawlings, 200 Fed. 131, 133 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912); In re Feinberg,
287 Fed. 254, 256 (E. D. Pa. 1923).
1. Those who were responsible for Section 20 believed that it would relieve every
authorized trustee from liability on a negotiable instrument if the trust estate was dis-
closed. Eaton, The Negotiable Instruments Law: Its History and its Practical Operation
(1903) 2 Mcn. L. Rxv. 260, 272. See BRANNAN, NECOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw (5th
ed. Beutel, 1932) 272; WARREN, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES VTUOUT INCORPORATION (1929)
864; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1924) § 312. But see BRANNAN, NEGOTABLE INSTRUMENTS
LAW (4th ed. Chafee, 1926) 176.
2. Negotiable Instruments Law, § 20.
3. See Taylor v. Davis' Adm'x, 110 U. S. 330, 334-335 (1884); BOoERT, TRusTs (1931)
296; 1 WILLISToN, CONTRACTS (1924) § 312.
4. Liability attaches where trust is disclosed. Petition of Eddy, 6 F. (2d) 196 (C. C. A.
1st, 1925); Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606, 91 Pac. 518 (1907); Bradner Smith and Co.
v. Williams, 178 IIl. 420, 53 N. E. 358 (1899); Philip Carey Co. v. Pingree, 223 Mass.
352, 111 N. E. 857 (1916); Scott, Liabilities Incurred in the Administration of Trusts,
(1915) 28 Hav. L. REv. 725; Stone, A Theory of Liability of Trust Estates for the
Contracts and Torts of the Trustee (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 527. And also where It Is
not disclosed. Frost v. Shackleford, 57 Ga. 260 (1876); Everett v. Drew, 129 Mass. 150
(1880); McGovern v. Bennett, 146 Mich. 558, 109 N. W. 1055 (1906).
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act, which was meant to include also executors and administrators,5 as well as exec-
utives of incorporated and unincorporated associations.0 Nor can it be said con-
sistently with these other principles that a trustee acts as a representative of the
trust estate.7 Broadly speaking, perhaps a trustee does represent the estate, for
his authority to deal with the res is prescribed 15y the instrument creating the trust
estate in-him; but in making contracts for the benefit of the estate, since he holds
the only legal title, he is regarded by the law as representing only himself.8 More-
over, if it were said that the trustee is included within the meaning of Section 20
by the use of the words "representative capacity," it would logically follow that a
trustee should have a representative capacity in relation to any type of contract
he made. It is true that the common law has recognized definite methods by which
the trustee can be said to create in himself a representative capacity under any
contract.9  The courts have sought in each case to find out whether the trustee
secured the release of his personal estate as a credit factor, and on what credit
basis the creditor accepted the contract. Thus, the trustee may avoid personal liability
if he stipulates in a contract that only the trust property may be looked to in
settlement;' 0 and some courts will freely imply such a contract." Furthermore,
when the trust instrument provides such a limitation and the creditor knows of it,
the trustee's personal immunity is also guaranteed.' 2 Or from the same facts the
court may find that the trustee is "merely an agent."'13 But these are exceptions;
and they require some affirmative action on the part of the trustee which will make
him a representative. Therefore, they cannot affect the interpretation of the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, and the conflicting inferences of Section 20 still remain.
5. The liability of executors and administrators at common law was the same as
trustees'. See Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240 (1858); Germania Bank of St. Paul v.
Michaud, 62 Minn. 459, 65 N. W. 70 (1895). And this also was sought to be changed
by the Negotiable Instruments Law. See Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 123, 225 Pac. 1045
(1924); Note (1931) 9 N. C. L. REv. 443.
6. See BANNAN, NEGOTIABLE IxsmRaw rum s LAW (5th ed. Beutel, 1932) 272.
7. Magallan v. Gomes, 281 Mass. 383, 183 N. E. 833 (1933); Note (1933) 7 U. o'
CIx. L. REv. 288, 294.
8. See Duval v. Craig, 2 Wheat. 45 (U. S. 1817); Taylor v. Davis' Adm'x, 110 U. S.
330 (1884).
9. The contract of the parties must necessarily concede the personality of the trust
estate, for a contrary analysis might result in the instrument being held nonnegotiable as
not carrying the general credit of the maker. BriGEow, BEnls, Noras AD Cmcs (3d
ed. 1928) § 94; WARREN, CoRPoRATE" ADVANTAGES Winour Icononrxoi (1929) Z64.
This cannot result if the trust estate is the principal; then the instrument carries the
general credit of the maker.
10. Such a stipulation is expressly made when the trustee contracts "as trustee and
not otherwise.' Bank of Topeka v. Eaton, 100 Fed. 8 (C. C. Mass. 1900); Shoe and
Leather National Bank v. Dix, 123 Mass. 148 (1877); Hussey v. Arnold, 185 Mass. 202,
70 N. E. 87 (1904); Brackett v. Foulds, 110 N. Y. Supp. 779 (3d Dep't, 1903); Morehead
Banking Co. v. Morehead, 116 N. C. 413, 21 S. E. 191 (1895).
11. Printup v. Trammel, 25 Ga. 240 (1858); Glenn v. Allison, 58 Md. 527 (182);
Boyle v. Rider, 136 Md. 286, 110 Ati. 524 (1920); Crate v. Luippold, 43 N. Y. Supp.
824 (4th Dep't, 1897).
12. Gutelius v. Sanborn, 39 F. (2d) 621 (D. Mass. 1930); Charles Nelson Co. v.
Morton, 62 Cal. App. 402, 288 Pac. 845 (1930); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225
Pac. 1045 (1924); Adams v. Swig, 234 Mass. 534, 125 N. E. 857 (1920); Baker v. James,
280 Mass. 541, 181 N. E. 861 (1932).
13. Brown v. Smith, 73 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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These inferences have created a diversity in state court decisions as to whether,
in spite of the logical obstacles, a note so signed should be considered a liability
only of the trust estate. Some courts have called a trustee a representative, dis-
regarding the logical implications which if followed would change all trustee lia-
bility.14 Others have flatly refused to apply the Negotiable Instruments Law.10
And in other jurisdictions, where the question has not been settled, there is unfor-
tunate uncertainty unless the situation is regulated by other specific statutory pro-
vision.10 The result is that the question, instead of being definitely decided, is
still open to complicated litigation either involving the common law exceptions to
the trustee's liability, or based on facts which show that the trustee was not intended
to be held personally liable.
This is aptly illustrated in a recent Circuit Court of Appeals decision 17 where
the plaintiff sued to recover on a promissory note signed by the defendant as "Robert
Smith, Trustee of Fair Haven Estates." The plaintiff had conveyed certain land
to the defendant, who accepted conveyance, issued the notes and a purchase money
mortgage, all as trustee. The trust instrument which was executed to develop this
land provided that neither the trustee nor the shareholders, who were the cestuis,
should be personally liable for any obligations incurred by the trustee in the admin-
istration. The plaintiff had notice of these terms. Moreover, he had knowledge
that the defendant as settler created himself trustee, and held almost the entire
cestuis' interest with the intention of retaining by the trust device the benefits of
private ownership and at the same time of securing limited liability. The Court
accepted the view that under Florida law a business trust cannot exist as a distinct
entity, but held that the defendant, although he signed as "trustee," was not liable
because the plaintiff knew of the limitation in the trust instrument and dealt with
him as an agent, and not as a party to the contract. Thus, Section 20 was not
even considered. It was necessary to decide the case on other grounds, whereas
if that section were unequivocal, there would never have been a question as to
liability and hence no, or more simple, litigation; for suit would only be on an
express agreement by the trustee to lend his personal credit to the transaction.
In this manner, principles of agency and, to a greater extent, the exceptions to
the trustee's common law liability are continually being invoked on the question
whether or not the creditor accepted the contract without relying on the trustee's
personal estate as a credit factor. Even in the absence of special circumstances,
it may perhaps be argued that when a trustee signs as trustee, designating the
14. American Trust Co. v. Canevin, 184 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Hawthorne v.
Austin Organ Co., 71 F. (2d) 945 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934); Cotton v. Courtright, 215 Ala.
474, 111 So. 7 (1927); Riordan and Co. v. Thornsbury, 178 Ky. 324, 198 S. W. 920
(1917); Megowan v. Peterson, 173 N. Y. 1, 65 N. E. 738 (1902); Kerby v. Ruegamer,
107 App. Div. 491, 95 N. Y. Supp. 408 (2d Dep't, 1905); Wilson v. Clinton Chapel
Church, 138 Tenn. 398, 198 S. W. 244 (1917); First National Bank of Salem v. Jacobs,
85 W. Va. 653, 102 S. E. 491 (1920); Huntington Finance Co. v. Young, 105 W, Va.
405, 143 S. t. 102 (1928); First National Bank of Pennsboro v, Delancey, 109 W. Va.
136, 153 S. E. 908 (1930).
15. Magallan v. Gomes, 281 Mass. 383, 183 N. E. 833 (1933). But cf. Exchange
National Bank of Atchison v. Betts' Estate, 103 Kan. 807, 176 Pac. 660 (1918).
16. CAL. CIV. CODE (Deering, 1931) Act 652, § 91; MONT. Rxv. CODE Anx. (Choate
Supp. 1927) § 7914; N. D. Comp. LAws ANN. (1913) § 6305; S. D. Comp. LAws (1929)
§ 1220. The trustee is called the general agent of the estate, and creditors are allowed to go
directly against the estate. Cf. In re Estate of Manning, 134 Iowa 165, 111 N. W. 409
(1907); Note (1932) 18 CoN. L. Q. 134.
17. Brown v. Smith, 73 F. (2d) 524 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934).
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estate for which he acts, he may be said to act not for or on behalf of himself,
but only as agent for the benefit of the estate, and any person dealing with him
would naturally so interpret the facts. 7 On the other hand, it is difficult to draw
such an inference from the mere fact of disclosure, for where the law is clear that
the trustee is personally liable in such a case,4 the contracting party may be said
to have been aware of the fact, and consequently to have relied upon the personal
credit of the trustee as well as on the credit of the estate itself. A different situ-
ation does arise, however, when the trust instrument provides that only the trust
property may be looked to in the settlement of any liability, and the creditor knows
of this provision. If this occurs in relation to business trusts, which are formed
primarily to limit all liability to the amount of the trust estate, the limitation is
generally successful.' s But when the problem is presented in the case of a private
trust, most courts hold otherwise on the ground that the decisions in the business
trust cases depend only on the business facts which show to creditors a definite
limited liability.19  This distinction seems specious, for in a private trust a clause
in the instrument that the trustee is relieved from liability, and a tacit understanding
by the creditor that the trust estate alone will be looked to, can be found with
equal facility.20 And, where by statute a trustee who discloses his relationship with
the trust estate is relieved from personal liability, another problem is added by the
decisions which divide on the question as to whether a trustee who signs merely as
such, without disclosing the trust estate, may show by parole evidence that the neces-
sary disclosure was made outside the instrument.2 1  All this adds complications
making for litigation. Section 20, if properly drawn, might have proved generally
beneficial to avoid much of this litiation. The only plausible suggestion to relieve
the logical inconsistencies and the uncertainties is an express statute, which has been
enacted in some states, making a trustee the agent of the trust estate.1 c
POWER OF SETTLOR TO REvoKE TRUST UNDER SECTION 23 o NEW Yonx PmsoNAx.
PROPERTY LAW
BY A deed made in contemplation of intended marriage, a trust in personal property
was created by a minor female with the sanction of the Chancery Division of the
High Court of Justice of England. After the marriage had occurred, an American
18. Gutelius v. Sanborn, 39 F. (2d) 621 (D. M,1ass. 1930); Charles Nelson Co. v. Mor
ton, 62 Cal. App. 402, 288 Pac. 845 (1930); Hamilton v. Young, 116 Kan. 128, 225 Pac.
1045 (1924); Adams v. Swig, 234 Mass. 584, 125 N. E. 857 (1920); Bowen v. Farley,
256 Mass. 19, 152 N. E. 69 (1926).
19. This distinction is upheld in Note (1933) 7 U. or Cn. L. R!v. 283.
20. Some courts have even been willing to go so far as to say that whenever a p-on
takes an instrument signed by a trustee as such for a known trust, it is with the tacit un-
derstanding that the trustee shall be relieved from liability and the trust estate alone looked
to in payment. American Trust Co. v. Canevin, 184 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); KerbV
v. Ruegamer, 107 App. Div. 491, 95 N. Y. Supp. 403 (2d Dep't, 190); First Nat. Bank
of Pennsboro v. Delancey, 109 W. Va. 136, 153 S. E. 903 (1930); Note (1931) 9 N. C. L.
Rxv. 443.
21. The courts which have allowed parole evidence are: American Trust Co. v. Canevin,
184 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 3d, 1911); Hazlett v. Willaume, 76 Fla. 514, 80 So. 309 (1918);
Phelps v. Weber, 84 N. J. L. 630, 87 At. 469 (1913); Huntington Finance Co. v. Young,
105 W. Va. 405, 143 S. E. 102 (1928). Those that have not are: Dayries v. Lindsley, 128
La. 259, 54 So. 791 (1911); Daniel v. Buttner, 38 Wash. 556, 80 Pac. 811 (1905).
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trustee was substituted and the original indenture amended by a deed of variation.
The indenture as so amended provided in part that the trustee should pay the in-
come of the trust fund to the settler during her life, and after her death should hold
the principal and income of the fund in trust for the child or children or remoter issue
of the settlor upon such terms and conditions as the settlor should by deed or will
appoint,1 and in default of appointment that the trustee should hold the fund in trust
for the child or children of the settlor in equal shares.2 The settler reserved to her-
self the powers to withdraw up to $250,000 from the corpus, and to revoke all but
$500,000 of the trust, both upon the written consent of the trustee. The deed of
variation specified that the trust was to be construed and was to take effect, and
the rights of all parties were to be regulated under the laws of New York. The
settlor, by a written instrument, attempted to exercise her powers of withdrawal and
of revocation over the entire revocable portion of the trust; the trustee, however,
withheld its consent.3 Thereafter, the settlor exercised the power of appointment
reserved to her by making a revocable appointment by deed of the remainder after
her life estate to her grandchildren who should be living at her death. At the time
of this appointment, the settlor had two children, the eldest but fourteen months old,
and, of course, no grandchildren. A few months later, the settlor served notice of
revocation of the entire trust upon the trustee, who had already begun proceedings
to determine the rights and interests of the parties. A guardian ad litem was ap,
pointed to represent the children in the action by the trustee. The Supreme Court
of New York determined, without opinion, that the appointment to unborn grand-
children was valid, that the interests of the two children were divested thereby, and
that the trust was revocable by the sole act of the settlor 4 under Section 23 of the
New York Personal Property Law.6 The Appellate Division affirmed the decision,
again without opinion, 6 and the case is now being appealed to the Court of Appeals.
1. The power to appoint among children or remoter issue was an exclusive one; that Is,
permitting the appointment to certain members of the class to the total exclusion of the
others.
2. The corpus was to be held in trust for those who might take in default of appoint-
ment until they reached 21 or, if female, married, and in case a child or children should die
before the corpus was payable, such share or shares were to be divided among the sur-
vivors. The deed clearly indicated that the child or children would take under the de-
fault clause, after the settlor's death, not contingently upon their reaching 21 or, If female,
married, but that their interests should continue vested after her death subject to being
divested by their deaths prior to the occurrence of such events. Cf. WALsH, FUTURE
INTEREsTss IN NEW YORx (1931) 37.
3. The reasons given by the settlor for her attempted revocation were that, because of
the unstable condition of the dollar, she considered that the corpus of the trust would be
best preserved by investing the capital in other ways than those permitted by the laws of
New York relative to trust funds, and that she felt it her duty to her descendants to make
this effort to conserve the corpus. Record 59, Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 242 App. DIv.
819, 275 N. Y. Supp. 649 (1st Dep't, 1934).
4. Record, supra note 3, at 82-84. A motion by the trustees to reopen the case and
for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the unborn grandchildren was de-
nied. Record 105-106.
5. Section 23 of the Personal Property Law (1909) reads as follows: "Upon the written
consent of all the persons beneficially interested in a trust in personal property or any part
thereof heretofore or hereafter created, the creator of such trust may revoke the whole or
such part thereof, and thereupon the estate of the trustee shall cease in the whole or such
part thereof."
6. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Harris, 242 App. Div. 819, 275 N. Y. Supp. 649 (Ist Dep't,
1934). Two judges dissented.
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Under Section 23,5 the settlor of a trust in personal property may revoke with
the consent of all persons beneficially interested in the trust. Before the appointment
in the present case, the trust could not have been thus revoked since the infancy
of the settlor's children, who were beneficially interested within the meaning of the
section, precluded their consent3 Two New York cases, Cram v. Walker3 and Aranyi
v. Bankers' Trnst,9 have interpreted the statute as meaning that only the consent of
such beneficiaries as are in being is required. If, then, the settlor could divest her
children of their beneficial interests by her appointment, she would be able, under
those two decisions, to revoke solely by her own act,'0 since no other living parson
had a beneficial interest in the trust.
Passing for the moment the problem of whether the appointment as exercised was
invalid as a fraud on the power of appointment, the ability of the settlor to revoke
depends upon a determination of whether the vested interests of the two children
could be completely divested by an appointment subject to certain conditions, namely,
the birth of the appointees (the grandchildren) and their surviving the settlor, and
of whether Section 23 requires only the consent of living beneficiaries for revocation
of a trust. In regard to the first question, the interests of the children under the
terms of the trust became vested upon their birth,'1 subject to being partiallyla or
totally divested.' 3  Whether their interests could be divested, however, by the mere
exercise of the reserved power or whether the divestiture remained incomplete until
the contingent interests appointed to unborn grandchildren became vested upon ex-
istence of such grandchildren at the settlor's death is, in part, a matter of intention
to be gathered from the trust instrument. Clearly, it would be possible to phrase a
deed in such a manner that those who would take in default of appointment (the
settlor's children) would be totally excluded by the simple execution of an appoint-
ment, irrespective of its validity or effectiveness;14 and, if such appointment were
invalid or ineffectual, the share appointed would then go by intestacy. But here
the type and tenor of the trust instrument lead to the conclusion that the children
could not be so excluded. Not only was the instrument part of an antenuptial settle-
ment, a fact which in itself indicates that the settlor did not intend intestacy to
occur through a lapsed appointment,' 5 but also the provisions of the trust make quite
7. Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929); Gage v.
Irving Bank and Trust Co., 222 App. Div. 92, 225 N. Y. Supp. 476 (2d Dep't, 1927).
8. 173 App. Div. 804, 160 N. Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dep't, 1916).
9. 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614 (1st Dep't, 1922).
10. A provision that the trust is irrevocable does not destroy the settlor's right of revo-
cation under Section 23. Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust, 201 App. Div. 706, 194 N. Y. Supp.
614 (1st Dep't, 1922); Schwartz v. Fulton Trust Co., 119 Misc. 831, 198 N. Y. Supp. 275
(Sup. Ct. 1922); Franklin v. Chatham Phenix National Bank, 234 App. Div. 369, 255 N.
Y. Supp. 115 (1st Dep't, 1932). The point was raised and unanswered in a more recent
case. Berlenbach v. Chemical Bank and Trust Co., 235 App. Div. 170, 256 N. Y. Supp. 563
(1st Dep't, 1932), aff'd without opinion, 260 N. Y. 539, 184 N. E. 83 (1932).
11. GRAY, RuLs AGAINST PERPL~rr7ES (3d ed. 1915) §§ 112, 112a, and cases there cited.
12. The subsequent birth of additional children would cause partial divestiture.
13. I.e. by their deaths prior to the settlors, or, if they outlived the settlor, by their
deaths prior to the time when the corpus was payable to them, or through the exercLa of
the power of appointment.
14. This would occur if the settlor had expressy provided that any attempt at appaint-
ment, irrespective of its legal effect, should divest the gift in default of appointment.
15. The purposes of the antenuptial settlement, to preserve the property for the settlors
lineal descendants and to remove it from the control of her husband, militate against
the conclusion that the settlor might have intended intestacy to occur upon any contingency,
for in case of intestacy her husband would take a larger share.
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apparent the settlor's intention to provide for every eventuality. Furthermore, there
was a clause prohibiting any child, to whom or to whose issue an appointment had
been made, from sharing in the unappointed part of the corpus unless he or she
brought the appointed shares into hotchpot. The implication of this would seem to
be that the settler did not intend that any child should be divested of his or her
share under the default clause by a mere appointment, but only by the actual accep-
tance and the vesting of the appointed share. 16
If, then, there is no intent that the mere appointment should divest the gift to the
children in default of appointment, what is the status of those interests before the
conditional appointment 1" takes effect?' 8 There is much authority to the effect
that where an appointment is legally ineffectual, either because it violates the rule
against perpetuities 19 or because it does not accord with the authorization in the
instrument creating the power, 20 the property subject to the power goes as in de-
fault of the appointment. Where the appointment, though legal, becomes ineffective
through the nonoccurrence of the contingency, the appointed shares are regarded as
having been unappointed and go as in default of appointment. 21 Likewise where the in-
terests can vest only at an undetermined time, or at a postponed time as stated in the
appointment, the income on the appointed shares during that period passes under the
residuary appointment, if there be one, or, if none, then to those who would take in
default of appointment. 22 From these facts it would appear that the interests of the
two children of the settler in the present case have not been divested by the settlor's
appointment, that they remain persons beneficially interested 23 in the trust until
16. Record, supra note 3, at 21. If the simple act of appointment divested a child of
his or her interest under the default clause, then even the surrender of the appointed share
could not have entitled the child to share in the unappointed portion.
17. One English case has held that an appointment among a class of persons not ascer-
tained at the time of its exercise was invalid, because the exercise of a power is discretion-
ary and must be made with reference to the respective merits and circumstances of the per-
sons who are to take, and, therefore, it cannot be exercised when the persons are unknown,
Blight v. Hartnoll, 19 Ch. D. 294 (1881). The statement was criticized in FARWELL, POWERS
(3d ed. 1916) 168. The author considered it dictum and contrary both to authority and
practice. Cf. Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. 357, 362 (Ch. 1794).
18. This situation is not to be confused with the problem of whether an appointment
of a valid vested interest to one who would also take in default of appointment is to be
considered a gift as of the time of the original instrument or as of the time of the appoint-
ment. The effective date under this set-up becomes important where, for example, the
appointment is made subsequent to the bankruptcy of the appointee, In re Vizard's Trusts,
L. R. 1 Ch. App. 588 (1866); or subsequent to the marriage of the appointee in a com-
munity property jurisdiction, De Serre v. Clarke, L. R. 18 Eq. 587 (1874); or under certain
inheritance tax statutes, Matter of Harbeck, 161 N. Y. 211, 55 N. E. 850 (1900) ; Matter of
Lansing, 182 N. Y. 238, 74 N. E. 882 (1905); Attorney-General v. Earl of Selborne [19021
1 K. B. 388, 398.
19. GRAY, RuLE AGAINST Paiwmuznis (3d ed. 1915) § 258.
20. Id. at § 256; see Hillen v. Iselin, 144 N. Y. 365, 374, 39 N. E. 368, 371 (1895).
21. Lakin v. Lakin, 34 Beav. 443 (Rolls Ct. 1865); cf. Duke of Marlborough v. Lord
Godolphin, 2 Ves. Sr. 61, 78 et seq. (Ch. 1750).
22. Caulfield v. MacGuire, 2 J. & L. 141, 170 (Ch. 1845); FARWELL, POWERS (3d ed.
1916) 345, 346. Also compare F~Auw=a, at 186, where it was said that "the estate In
default can only be defeated by an appointment which takes effect and only to the extent
to which such appointment does take effect", citing Doe v. Denny, cited in 2 Wils. 337 (K.
B. 1767).
23. Whether an interest is vested or contingent makes no difference in regard to the
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the appointment becomes effective, and that their consent to revocation is both neces-
sary and unobtainable, since they are minors.
Even if it be assumed that the children no longer have an interest in the trust
after the appointment, there remains the problem of whether only the consent of
living beneficiaries will suffice for revocation of the trust. The statements to that
effect in Cram v. Walkers and Aranyi v. Bankcrs' TrustO appear to be far broader
than the situations in those cases required; they can be regarded as dicta, and should
be considered misconceptions of the purposes of Section 23. In the former case, a
husband and wife conveyed property in trust to a trustee to divide the income be-
tween the two settlors during their joint lives, and after the death of one to divide
the corpus into two equal parts, transferring one to their then living child or children
and retaining the other in trust to pay the income to the surviving settlor for life,
and at his or her death to transfer the principal of that part to their then living child
or children or children of any deceased child. The wife had died, and the only child.
then an adult, had received one-half of the corpus at her death. Thereafter, the sur-
viving settlor attempted to revoke with the consent of his son. The court, having
stated that the consent of only living beneficiaries was required, then proceeded to
show that, since the son could represent his own children, who would take only if
their father predeceased their grandfather, and who would derive their claim solely
through their father, his consent alone was necessary. Thus, reliance upon the doc-
trine of representation2 4 solely would have been sufficient to have enabled the court
to reach its desired result. In Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust,9 the settlor of the trust was
to receive the income until she reached the age of 35. At that date the trust was
to be terminated and the corpus to be returned to her; but if she died prior to reach-
ing that age, the corpus was to go to her children, if she had any, or in default thereof
to her appointees by will. At the time of her attempted revocation she had no chil-
dren. The Appellate Division repeated its broad statement made in Cram v. Walher,s
that only the consent of living beneficiaries was necessary for revocation, and then
pointed out that the trust was solely for the benefit of the settlor, that she did not
intend her children to be beneficiaries, and that as to them the trust deed was testa-
mentary25 in character, giving them but a mere expectancy. If such were the inten-
tion of the settlor, then here, too, the sweeping generality was simply surplusageY
Prior to the enactment of Section 23, in 1909, Section 15 of the Consolidated Per-
sonal Property Law had made the voluntary destruction of an active trust in per-
sonal property impossible by prohibiting assignment or alienation of the income from
the trust by the beneficiary entitled to it or by any act of the trustee in contra-
requirement of consent under Section 23. Schoellkopf v. Marine Trust Co., 242 App. Div.
11, 272 N. Y. Supp. 613 (4th Dep't, 1934), noted in (1934) 20 Com. L. Q. 116; Kuntza
v. Guaranty Trust Co., 242 App. Div. 7, 272 N. Y. Supp. 833 (1st Dep't, 1934). For the
same result see Mayer v. Chase National Bank, 143 Misc. 714, 257 N. Y. Supp. 161 (Sup.
Ct. 1932), which also is authority for the appointment of a guardian ad litem to reprcent
the contingent interests of after-born next of kin.
24. Kent v. Church of St. Michael, 136 N. Y. 10, 32 N. E. 704 (1892); Fox v. Fee, 24
App. Div. 314, 323, 49 N. Y. Supp. 292, 298 (4th Dep't, 1897) and cases there cited.
25. See Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust, 201 App. Div. 706, 70S, 194 N. Y. Supp. 614, 616
(1st Dep't, 1922).
26. Neither the Court of Appeals nor the other departments of the Appellate Divi:ion
have as yet passed upon the correctness of the First Department's interpretation of the
statute. In a recent case, the Fourth Department mentioned the problem, and indicated
that Cram v. Walker and Aranyi v. Bankers' Trust had not foreclosed controversy. Schoell-
kopf v. Marine Trust Co., 242 App. Div. 11, 16, 272 N. Y. Supp. 613, 619 (4th Dzp't,
1934).
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vention of the trust.2 7 Section 23 was designed to do away with this statutory dis-
ability of the person entitled to the income.28 As to such a beneficiary, it permitted
a limited type of assignment by his consenting to revocation with the agreement of
the settlor,29 thus giving such a trust a measure of destructibility. But as to thoso
beneficiaries whose interests were in remainder, and not in the income of the trust,
Section 15 had never had any application,30 such interests being freely allenable.3 1
There is no reason to suppose, therefore, that, as to the latter, Section 23 was in.
tended to change the common law rule,32 which was that termination of a trust would
be refused where there were unborn or unascertained beneficiaries. 3 Furthermore, it
27. Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N. Y. 326, 32 N. E. 1088 (1893).
28. Cf. Hoskin v. Long Island Loan and Trust Co., 139 App. Div. 258, 123 N. Y. Supp.
994 (2d Dep't, 1910). One of the authors of the revision of the Personal Property Law,
writing in the same year in which Section 23 was enacted, stated that the section was de-
signed to permit "in effect beneficiaries of a trust to receive the income of personal property
to assign their interests, with the consent of the creator of the trust, by consenting to a re-
vocation thereof. This would otherwise be an assignment in contravention of the pro-
hibition expressed in Section 15 of this act." FowLER, PmEsoXAL PRoErarv LAW o0 Nsw
YoRK (2d ed. 1909) 124-125.
29. Cf. Baker v. Fifth Ave. Bank, 225 App. Div. 238, 232 N. Y. Supp. 238 (1st Dep't
1928) where the court finds harmonious the composite result of uniting the two statutes,
and does so by distinguishing "revocation" from "transfer."
30. Bergmann v. Lord, 194 N. Y. 70, 86 N. E. 828 (1909), aff'g 122 App. Div. 921,
107 N. Y. Supp. 1121 (1st Dep't, 1907).
31. Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alienable. N. Y. REAL PRoP. LAW
(1909) § 59. An expectant estate is defined as one "in which the right of possession is
postponed to a future time," id. at § 35; future estates are expectant estates, id, at § 36;
and remainders are future estates, id. at § 38. These provision apply to personal property
as well as real property, and equitable as well as legal estates. National Park Bank v.
Billings, 144 App. Div. 536, 129 N. Y. Supp. 846 (1st Dep't, 1911) aff'd without opinion,
203 N. Y. 556, 96 N. E. 1122 (1911); Lauter v. Hirsch, 67 Misc. 165, 121 N. Y. Supp, 651
(Sup. Ct. 1910) ; Matter of Leverich, 135 Misc. 774, 238 N. Y. Supp. 533 (Surr. Ct. 1929);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Curry, 134 Misc. 99, 234 N. Y. Supp. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
32. Hurt v. Gilmer, 59 App. D. C. 282, 40 F. (2d) 794 (1930); lnderhill v. United
States Trust Co., 227 Ky. 444, 13 S. W. (2d) 502 (1929); In re Thurston, 154 Mass. 596,
29 N. E. 53 (1891) ; Closset v. Burtchaell, 112 Ore. 585, 230 Pac. 554 (1924) ; Jones' Trust
Estate, 284 Pa. 90, 130 Atl. 314 (1925); 2 Pmutv, TRusTs' (7th ed. 1929) § 920.
It should be noted that certain beneficiaries who would be called unascertained at com-
mon law are not so considered in New York. For example, in Doctor v. Hughes, 225
N. Y. 305, 122 N. E. 221 (1919), it was indicated that a gift to one's heirs or next of kin
could be a remainder if so intended; but such intent was not found in that case. In
Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929), such intent was
found and the rule applied. Subsequent cases, either following the Wldhttemore case cor-
rectly or misinterpreting it to have held that any gift to one's next of kin was a remainder,
have applied a doctrine similar to the famous doctrine of Moore v. Littel, 41 N. Y. 66
(1869), and have held that this remainder is vested, requiring under Section 23 only the
consent to revocation of the persons who now fit the description. Hussey v. City Bank
Farmers' Trust Co., 236 App. Div. 117, 258 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1st Dep't, 1932), aff'd without
opinion, 261 N. Y. 533, 185 N. E. 726 (1933); Cagiardi v. Bank of New York, 230 App.
Div. 192, 243 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1st Dep't, 1930); Corbett v. Bank of New York, 229
App. Div. 570, 242 N. Y. Supp. 638 (1st Dep't, 1930).
33. Except in certain cases where such beneficiaries may be validly represented by living
ones who are sui juris. See cases supra note 24.
is difficult to comprehend why the legislature should have used the words "all the
persons beneficially interested" if it intended to require the consent of only the lhing
beneficiaries. Certainly, if the intent were to include only living persons the lan-
guage of the statute could readily have been so worded.3-
The decision in the present case may be attacked on an additional ground, namely,
that the appointment to unborn grandchildren was a fraud on the power of appoint-
ment. The donee of a special, exclusive power of appointment among a particular
class, although given discretion in determining the particular appointees and their
shares, is, nevertheless, limited in his acts solely to carrying out the real purpose
of the power. Whether or not the donee was himself the creator of the power, as
in the present case, his exercise of it must be made in good faith and without any
ulterior motives of benefit to himself, and without any purposes beyond the extent
of the power.35 Thus, an appointment to a dying child by a father, who had been
given a power to appoint among his children, has been considered invalid as a fraud
on the power, since it was executed not to benefit the appointee but so that the benefit
of the appointment might accrue to the donee himself as heir and next of kin of the
appointee.30 In the instant case, the exercise of the power of appointment should
likewise be regarded as a fraud on the power, even though here made possible by re-
sort to a collateral statute, namely, Section 23.
There are thus three independent grounds upon which a reversal of the present de-
cision might be predicated: first, that the settlor's children still have an interest in
the trust, requiring their consent for revocation; second, that the trust is in no wise
revocable since there are unborn beneficiaries interested in the trust who cannot be
represented; and third, that the attempted exercise of the power of appointment was
void as a fraud on powers.
34. The North Carolina statute, permitting the settlor of a voluntary trust to revoke
future contingent interests of unborn or undetermined beneficiaries prior to the happ2ning
of the contingencies vesting such estates, quite simply expresses the purpoe which the:
two cases attempt to imply in the New York statute. N. C. CODE As,.. (Mihie, 1931)
§ 996, applied in Stanback v. Citizens' National Bank, 197 N. C. 292, 148 S. E. 313 (1929).
noted in (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 92; McRae v. Commerce Union Trust Co., 199 N. C. 714,
155 S. E. 614 (1930).
35. Birley v. Birley, 25 Beav. 299 (Rolls Ct. 1858); Portland v. Topham, 11 H. L. Cas.
32 (1864); Pryor v. Pryor, 2 De G. J. & S. 205 (Ch. 1864); D'Abbadie v. Bizoin, S Ir. Pt.
Eq. 205 (1871). These cases are said to be good precedents in New York. CHAPZMi, Ey-
P~ss TRusTs AND PowERs (1897) §§ 661, 665.
36. Wellesley v. Mlornington, 2 K. & 3. 143 (Ch. 1855). See also Hichinbroke v.
Seymour, 1 Bro. C. C. 395 (1784), discussed more fully as Lord Sandwich's case in Mc-
Queen v. Farquhar, 11 Ves. 467, 479 (Ch. 1805); Palmer v. Wheeler, 2 Ba. & Be. 18
(1811); Carroll v. Graham, 11 Jur. (N. S.) 1012 (V. C. Kindersley, 1865).
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